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INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most infamous of attack advertisements, titled “Peace,
Little Girl,” depicted a little girl in a field plucking petals from a daisy
as she counted up from one to nine.1 At the end of her count, a man’s
voice began counting down from ten.2 Upon reaching zero, an atomic
bomb exploded.3 As the mushroom cloud appeared on the television
screen, the voice of then-President Johnson stated: “These are the
stakes—to make a world in which all of God’s children can live, or go
into the dark. We must either love each other, or we must die.”4 The
ad was intended to attack statements that Barry Goldwater, the
Republican presidential candidate, had made regarding nuclear
warfare.5 Although the ad aired only once, it is credited with ushering
in a new era of American politics.6 However, attack ads are nothing
new—neither are anonymous ones.

1. ROBERT MANN, DAISY PETALS AND MUSHROOM CLOUDS: LBJ, BARRY
GOLDWATER, AND THE AD THAT CHANGED AMERICAN POLITICS 55 (2011).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 56.
6. Id. at 109–12.
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In 1800, President John Adams faced reelection against Thomas
Jefferson.7 The Alien and Sedition Act prevented anyone from
openly criticizing the President, so Jefferson sought other ways to get
his message out.8 Jefferson anonymously distributed campaign
propaganda9 and financially supported James Callender while
encouraging him to publish a series of essays in the Richmond
Examiner that attacked Adams, referring to him as a “hideous
hermaphroditical character which has neither the force or firmness of
a man, nor the gentleness and sensibility of a woman.”10 Adams
fought back, calling Jefferson “a mean-spirited, low-lived fellow, the
son of a half-breed Indian squaw, sired by a Virginia mulatto
father.”11
Today, negative campaign advertisements dominate the airwaves
during election cycles.12 Just as Americans have come to expect to see
more holiday-themed advertisements in November and December,13
they too have come to expect a flood of negative campaign ads in the
months preceding elections.14 In 2012, Americans witnessed the most
expensive election campaign in history, topping off at approximately
seven billion dollars.15 Modern attack ads, produced by strategy
teams including behavioral scientists,16 are noticeably less overt,
although no less persuasive, than they were in the nineteenth
century.17 Rather than employ traditional name calling, modern
7. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 536 (2001).
8. Id. at 536.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 536–37.
11. Then
&
Now:
Running
for
President,
PBS,
www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/then-and-now/presidents
(last
visited May 1, 2013).
12. Albert R. Hunt, Media Share Blame for Negative Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/us/15iht-letter15.html. In 2012, “80 percent
of [advertisements] put out by President Barack Obama and 84 percent of those by
Mitt Romney” were negative. Id. Over 90% of advertisements by outside groups
were negative. Id.
13. Stuart Elliott, Calendar Says October; Retailers Say It’s Christmas, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 29, 2012, at B3.
14. Pauline Arrillaga, Election 2012: Negativity Dominates Campaign Cycle,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 21, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
10/21/election-2012-negativity_n_1998436.html.
15. Audio recording: Open Meeting of the Federal Election Commission (Jan. 31,
2013) (statement of Ellen Weintraub, Chair, of the FEC), available at
http://www.fec.gov/audio/2013/2013013101.mp3.
16. Benedict Carey, Academic ‘Dream Team’ Helped Obama’s Effort, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2012, at D1.
17. See Hunt, supra note 12.
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attack ads use subliminal messaging18 and sympathetic personal
stories to paint negative pictures of political candidates.19
In 2012, an advertisement produced by Priorities USA Action used
the personal story of Joe Soptic.20 In the ad, Soptic described how he
lost his job and health insurance plan when Governor Romney
decided to close the plant where Soptic worked.21 Soptic’s wife later
became ill but did not tell him until he brought her to the hospital and
they discovered that it was too late to save her. “I don’t know how
long she was sick and I think maybe she didn’t say anything because
she knew that we couldn’t afford the insurance,” Soptic lamented.22
The ad ended with Soptic stating: “I do not think Mitt Romney
realizes what he’s done to anyone, and furthermore I do not think
[that he] is concerned.”23 The ad was widely criticized as tying
Governor Romney to cancer.24 Nevertheless, Priorities USA Action
defended the ad, calling it “wildly successful.”25 President Obama
responded in a news conference, stating: “I don’t think that Governor
Romney is somehow responsible for the death of the woman that was
portrayed in that ad. But keep in mind this is an ad that I didn’t
approve.”26
Priorities USA Action is a Super PAC,27 which means that it does
not contribute to or coordinate with federal candidates and can
receive unlimited contributions from individuals, corporations, and

18. See generally TALI MENDELBERG, THE RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY,
IMPLICIT MESSAGES, AND THE NORM OF EQUALITY (2001) (studying the use of
implicit racial appeals in political campaigns).
19. See Arrillaga, supra note 14.
20. Rachel Weiner, Priorities Ad Ties Mitt Romney to Cancer Death, WASH.
POST (Aug. 7, 2012, 8:16 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/thefix/post/priorities-ad-ties-mitt-romney-to-cancer-death/2012/08/07/d723d8c0-e08411e1-8fc5-a7dcf1fc161d_blog.html.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Sabrina Siddiqui, Priorities USA Action Defends Controversial Romney Ad
As ‘Wildly Successful’, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 9, 2012, 2:48 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/08/priorities-usa-action-romneyad_n_1756972.html.
26. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks to the White House
Press Corps (Aug. 20, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-house-press-corps.
27. See Super PACs, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/
superpacs.php?cycle=2012 (last updated Apr. 11, 2013).
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labor unions.28 Given that Super PACs are subject to extensive
disclosure requirements under the Federal Election Campaign Act
(“FECA”), one would think that it would be easy to determine who
funds Priorities USA Action’s ads, but that is not always the case.
Some of the information disclosed on Priorities USA Action’s
itemized receipts clearly identifies the source of contributions, but
some information does not.29 For example, in 2011, Priorities USA
Action received $215,234.42 in contributions from Priorities USA, a
501(c)(4) non-profit organization that is not required to disclose the
source of its contributions when it contributes that money to a Super
PAC.30
To date, the identities of the contributors of nearly 30% of money
spent in 2012 by outside organizations on campaign-related activity
subject to disclosure remain undisclosed.31 That figure was higher in
2010, at 44%.32 These statistics stand in stark contrast to prior election
years, where undisclosed spending averaged less than 5% and never
exceeded 13.3%.33 As undisclosed or “dark” money makes up a
greater portion of overall spending, the influence of anonymous
donors increases, and, accordingly, the public interest in knowing the
sources of contributions becomes more imperative.34
Some commentators point to the recent rise in undisclosed
spending as evidence that the interest in avoiding disclosure is both
strong and prevalent.35 They also point to statistics showing that

28. See Coordinated Communications and Independent Expenditures, FED.
ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/indexp.shtml (last
updated Jan. 2013); Independent Expenditure-Only Committees, FED. ELECTION
COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/press/press2011/ieoc_alpha.shtml (last updated May
20, 2013); see also infra Part II.A.1.
29. See Priorities USA Action, Report of Receipts and Disbursements (FEC
Form 3X) at 5 (Dec. 6, 2012), available at http://images.nictusa.com/
pdf/812/12963769812/12963769812.pdf.
30. See id. at 21.
31. See Outside Spending by Disclosure, Excluding Party Committees,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/disclosure.php (last
visited May 1, 2012).
32. Id.
33. Id. The statistics are based on data provided for the nine federal elections
that preceded 2008. Id.
34. See Kim Barker, In Montana, Dark Money Helped Democrats Hold a Key
Senate Seat, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 27, 2012, 11:40 AM), http://www.propublica.org/
article/in-montana-dark-money-helped-democrats-hold-a-key-senate-seat.
35. See Paul Blumenthal, ‘Dark Money’ In 2012 Election Tops $400 Million, 10
Candidates Outspent by Groups with Undisclosed Donors, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov.
2, 2012, 1:36 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/02/dark-money-2012-
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when disclosure requirements change, campaign spending shifts to
those activities that are subject to less or no disclosure.36 They argue
that individuals and groups that are determined to remain anonymous
will choose to redirect their spending, even where the alternatives are
more costly, rather than subject themselves to disclosure.37
For over a century, Congress has recognized the need for campaign
finance reform. Congress first addressed this need in 1907 when it
passed a law banning corporations and national banks from making
contributions in connection with political elections.38 Over the course
of the next forty years, Congress passed additional legislation that,
among other things, barred unions and corporations from making
independent expenditures, established contribution and spending
limits, and required disclosure of certain contributions and
expenditures.39 In 1971, these laws were consolidated into the
“”FECA.40 Congress has amended the FECA several times since its

election-400-million_n_2065689.html; see also Lee Drutman, Latest Dark Money
Tallies: $213 Million in the General Election and Counting, 81% on Behalf of
Republicans; 34 Races with $1 Million or More, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Nov. 2, 2012, 7:20
AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2012/11/02/dark-money-tallies/.
36. See Julius Chen, Electioneering Communications Start to Reemerge After
D.C. Circuit’s Van Hollen Ruling, INSIDE POL. L. (Oct. 1, 2012),
http://www.insidepoliticallaw.com/2012/10/01/electioneering-communications-startto-reemerge-after-d-c-circuits-van-hollen-ruling; Alex Engler, Dark Money
Organizations Change Strategies to Keep Donors Secret, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Sept.
25, 2012, 1:56 PM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2012/09/25/dark-moneyorganizations-change-strategies-to-keep-donors-secret/;
Kevin
Glandon,

“Electioneering Communications” Virtually Vanish in Wake of Van Hollen
Decision, INSIDE POL. L. (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.insidepoliticallaw.com/
2012/09/12/electioneering-communications-virtually-vanish-in-wake-of-van-hollendecision/; Robert Maguire, What Citizens United (et al) Wrought: The Shadow
Money Explosion, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Sept. 18, 2012, 12:53 PM),
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/09/what-citizens-united-et-al-wrought.html.
37. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign
Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708, 1737 (1999); Anthony Johnstone, A
Madisonian Case for Disclosure 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 413, 416 (2012); Geoffrey
A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other Costs of
Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 485–86 (2007); see also Fed. Election Comm’n v.
Wis. Right to Life (Wisconsin II), 551 U.S. 449, 515, 517 n.10 (2007) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (noting how the hydraulics of political money and the “‘ingenuity and
resourcefulness’ of political financiers revealed the massive regulatory gap left by
[Buckley’s] ‘magic words’ test,” and ultimately lead to an “explosive growth of
campaign-based advocacy, without even disclosure of its activities and funding
sources”).
38. See FEC, THIRTY YEAR REPORT 3 (2005).
39. See id. at 3–4.
40. See id. at 4.
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enactment, twice passing sweeping legislation that promised increased
disclosure.41
The actions and inactions of the executive and judicial branches of
the federal government, however, have undermined Congress’s
intentions and contributed to the recent rise in dark money. The
decisions of the Supreme Court’ and the rules promulgated by the
Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) have inadvertently created
easily exploitable loopholes in the FECA’s disclosure provisions.42
The FEC Commissioners are divided evenly over the proper scope of
the agency’s authority and the permissible interpretation of several
provisions of the FECA and corresponding regulations.43 These splits
have prevented the agency from promulgating any substantive rules
since Citizens United v. FEC44 and from taking action against any
conduct that falls beyond the scope of the FECA, as three
Commissioners have narrowly interpreted it. This narrow reading
essentially creates a bright-line test that provides organizations with a
manual for evading disclosure requirements.
Thus far, attempts to reduce deadlocks within the FEC and to
eliminate some of the adverse and unintended effects of some of the
Supreme Court’s decisions have failed. In 2008, then-candidate
Obama promised to appoint new FEC commissioners. Since taking
office, however, President Obama has made only one unsuccessful
attempt.45
Responding to the President’s call for increased
41. See id. at 5, 7 (discussing the 1974 Amendments to the FECA and the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002).
42. See generally infra Part II.A.2.
43. See infra Part II.B.2.
44. See Trevor Potter, President, Campaign Legal Ctr., Address to the Annual
Meeting of the American Law Institute (May 23, 2012), available at
http://www.campaignlegalcenterorg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i
d=1739:may-24-2012-trevor-potter-addresses-the-campaign-finance-crisis-in-speechto-the-american-law-institute-annual-meeting&catid=63:legal-center-pressreleases&Itemid=61 (discussing the FEC’s failure to garner the four votes necessary
to put out a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking revising regulations since Citizens
United).
45. See Editorial, That Campaign Promise About Campaigning, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/08/opinion/sunday/that-campaign-promiseabout-campaigning.html; Reforming the Federal Election Commission, CITIZENS FOR
RESP. & ETHICS WASH., http://www.citizensforethics.org/policy/entry/reforming-thefec (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). After a fifteen-month delay on a vote for Senate
approval, President Obama’s nominee withdrew his nomination citing a “broken
system.” Josh Isreal & Aaron Mehta, Withdrawn FEC Nominee Laments “Broken”
Confirmation Process, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Oct. 7, 2010),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2010/10/07/2450/withdrawn-fec-nominee-lamentsbroken-confirmation-process.
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disclosure,46 members of Congress twice brought bills to the floor
promising just that.47 Both bills, however, were ultimately defeated
by filibuster after failing to garner the sixty votes necessary to invoke
cloture.48 Although President Obama expressed dissatisfaction with
the defeat of the more recent bill49 and recent polls show that the vast
majority of Americans support disclosure of the source of
contributions to outside groups,50 the President has yet to call upon
Congress to continue its efforts to pass legislation increasing
disclosure.51
In the meantime, several state legislatures have adopted legislation
that would avoid creating the kinds of loopholes that are currently
apparent in the federal campaign laws. The constitutionality of these
laws, however, has been vigorously challenged in the courts.52 In
determining the validity of these laws which, like the federal laws, are
densely filled with campaign finance jargon incomprehensible to
laypersons,53 lower courts must grapple with a series of precedential
opinions that are “baffling[,] conflicted,”54 “unnecessarily
incoherent,” and which too frequently provide inadequate guidance
as to when compelled disclosure that goes beyond what the Supreme
Court has specifically upheld as permissible.55
Without clear

46. See State of the Union Address, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 8 (Jan. 27,
2010).
47. See Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections
Act of 2012, S. 3369, 112th Cong. (2011); Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting
Light on Spending in Elections Act of 2010, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2009).
48. See S. Res. 5007, 112th Cong. (2012), 158 CONG. REC. S5008 (daily ed. July 16,
2012) (roll call vote on motion to proceed); S. Res. 7383, 111th Cong. (2010), 156
CONG. REC. S7388 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2010) (same).
49. See President Barack Obama, Statement on Senate Action on Campaign
Finance Legislation, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (July 16, 2012).
50. Memorandum from Stan Greenberg et al., Democracy Corps, to Friends of
available
at
Democracy
Corps
et
al.
(Nov.
13,
2012),
http://www.democracycorps.com/attachments/article/930/dcor.pcaf.postelect.memo.1
11312.final.pdf (based on a survey finding that eighty-seven percent of Americans
who voted for Democrats and eighty-three percent of Americans who voted for
Republicans in the 2012 general election supported increased disclosure of spending
by outside groups).
51. See generally State of the Union Address, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1–13
(Feb. 12, 2013).
52. See generally infra Part III.
53. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 471–72 (7th Cir.
2012).
54. Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 355 (7th Cir. 2004).
55. See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109
MICH. L. REV. 581, 622–23 (2011); Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The
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guidance, some courts have opted to take a precautionary approach,
erring on the side of free speech,56 while other courts have upheld
equivalent laws, noting the importance of the government interest in
providing the public with adequate disclosure.57 The Supreme Court
has yet to clarify the permissible bounds of compelled disclosure.58
This Note consists of four parts. Part I examines the two
competing interests that are at the center of this debate—free speech
rights and the government’s interest in disclosure—and the
development of campaign finance jurisprudence over the past halfcentury. Part II explores the current federal disclosure requirements,
their inadequacies, and the ongoing debate among the FEC
Commissioners over the proper interpretation of the FECA’s
disclosure requirements. Part III focuses on states’ attempts to
increase disclosure for local elections beyond the federal
requirements and evaluates the divergent approaches taken by courts
in applying Supreme Court precedent and the exacting scrutiny
standard of review. Part IV proposes changes that can and should be
made by all branches of government to increase disclosure. Part IV
argues that in order to close the loopholes in the federal
requirements, Congress should do away with the major purpose test,
and the FEC should employ multi-factor tests to determine which
communications are express advocacy and electioneering
communications.
Part IV further argues that the heightened
specificity of review standard for laws banning speech should not
apply to mere disclosure laws, and that courts should be particularly

Roberts Court’s Deregulatory Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 1064, 1108–09 (2008); Richard L. Hasen, The Newer Incoherence: Competition,
Social Science, and Balancing in Campaign Finance Law After Randall v. Sorrell, 68
OHIO ST. L.J. 849, 849–50 (2007); Richard L. Hasen, Buckley Is Dead, Long Live
Buckley: The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 56–57 (2004); see also Ctr. for Individual
Freedom v. Tennant, 849 F. Supp. 2d 659, 687 n.25 (2011), rev’d on other grounds,
706 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the Supreme Court and Courts of
Appeals have issued “fractured and somewhat obscure opinions” in the area of
election-related laws).
56. See Tennant, 849 F.2d at 687 n.25 (describing the “significant analytical
struggle” undertaken in order to determine the validity of the state law).
57. For a discussion of cases upholding state disclosure laws, see generally infra
Part II.B.
58. See, e.g., Real Truth About Abortion v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 681 F.3d 544,
550 n.2 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 841 (2013) (mem.). This is the most
recent case addressing the constitutionality of disclosure laws in which the Supreme
Court has denied a writ of certiorari.
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deferential to state legislative attempts to reign in undisclosed
spending in light of the special interests that are involved.
I. BACKGROUND: FREE SPEECH R IGHTS AND COMPELLED
DISCLOSURE
A. Free Speech Rights

1.

The Origins of and Justifications for Free Speech Rights

The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”59 Enacted as part of the
Bill of Rights, the primary purpose of the freedom of speech clause
“was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs, including
discussion of candidates.”60 The First Amendment was added to the
Constitution, in part, to create a counterbalance to the immunities
provided to Congress in the Speech or Debate Clause.61 For election
debates to be equal, the ratifiers believed that the people needed to
enjoy the same freedoms as Congress when discussing the merits of
candidates.62 Thus, the First Amendment served not only to protect
the rights of unpopular minorities against a hostile majority, but also
to protect the “rights of popular majorities . . . against a possibly
unrepresentative and self-interested Congress.”63
A few years after the Constitution was ratified, Congress enacted
the Alien and Sedition Act (“Sedition Act”),64 limiting some of the
broad protections that the First Amendment guaranteed.65 Although

59. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
60. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2828
(2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
61. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 102–03
(2005).
62. Id. at 104.
63. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
21 (1998).
64. The Alien and Sedition Act “made it a crime, punishable by a $5,000 fine and
five years in prison, ‘if any person shall write, print, utter or publish . . . any false,
scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United
States, or either house of the Congress . . . or the President . . . with intent to defame
. . . or to bring them . . . into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them . . . the
hatred of the good people of the United States.’” N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 273–74 (1964) (quoting Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 596).
65. AMAR, supra note 61, at 103. James Callender, who had attacked President
Adams in a series of essays, was one of the individuals tried and convicted under the
Act. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 70 (1895).
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the Sedition Act significantly curtailed free speech rights, it did
protect one area of speech—the truth.66 Nevertheless, it was found to
be unconstitutional.67
The current understanding of the First Amendment is that it
provides the people with the right to openly criticize public officials
unless a public official can prove that the statement was made “with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard, whether it was
false or not.”68 This high bar protects the people’s right to “freely
examin[e] public characters and measures,”69 including those who
produce negative campaign ads.
Political speech made during election campaigns is considered to
be at the very core of the First Amendment.70 Political speech is not
limited to speech per se. Rather, it includes expressive conduct, such
as wearing armbands to protest a war,71 desecrating a flag,72 and
spending money on political speech.73 There are four primary
justifications for protecting free speech.74 First, free speech promotes
self-governance by allowing an open discussion of candidates.75
Second, free speech aids the public in discovering the truth by
facilitating a marketplace of ideas.76 Third, free speech advances
Finally, free speech
autonomy by protecting self-expression.77
promotes tolerance by protecting unpopular or distasteful speech.78
Protecting speech can also serve as a way to protect other
constitutional rights, such as the right to freedom of association,
66. AMAR, supra note 61, at 104.
67. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 274 (1964).
68. Id. at 279–80.
69. Id. at 274 (quoting 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 553–
54 (1876)).
70. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n., 558 U.S. 310, 339–40 (2010)
(“The First Amendment ‘has its fullest and most urgent application’ to speech
uttered during a campaign for political office.’” (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic
Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per
curiam) (“Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates
are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our
Constitution.”).
71. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
72. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 313 (1990).
73. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
74. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
926 (Vicky Been et al. eds., 4th ed. 2011).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 927–29.
77. Id. at 929.
78. See id. at 930.
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which includes the right to pool money through contributions, and the
right to privacy.79
Because free speech is considered to be so crucial in ensuring a
healthy, functioning democracy, laws restricting speech are generally
upheld only if they can survive strict scrutiny and, as a result, must be
narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest.80 The
Supreme Court has recognized, however, that there are
countervailing and often competing interests that justify regulating
political speech.81 In light of these competing interests, the Court has
created a two-tiered system of review for laws restricting political
speech.82 Laws that suppress speech—laws that, for example, limit the
amount that individuals, corporations, or other organizations can
spend on political speech—are reviewed under strict scrutiny.83 Laws
that burden speech, but that do not prevent anyone from speaking,
such as laws that impose disclosure requirements on those that spend
money on political speech, are subject to exacting scrutiny, which
requires that they must be “substantially related” to a “sufficiently
important” governmental interest.84

2.

Common Challenges to Laws Regulating Election-Related
Speech

The three most common challenges to laws restricting political
speech are that they are overly broad, vague, or directly violative of
the First Amendment. Laws restricting speech will be struck down on
their face if they are impermissibly vague, overbroad, create no set of
circumstances under which they would be valid,85 or lack any plainly
legitimate sweep.86 To prevail, a challenger must demonstrate a
substantial risk that enforcing the law would lead to the suppression
of speech.87 Facial invalidation is “manifestly strong medicine” that is

79. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65–66 (1976) (quoting Cal. Bankers Ass’n. v.
Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78–79 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)).
80. See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53–54 (1982).
81. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (upholding law
requiring solicitors to stand 100 feet from polling entrances based in part on
government’s compelling interest in protecting the fundamental right to vote).
82. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64.
83. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).
84. See id. at 366–67 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, 66, 96).
85. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 494 & n.5 (1982) (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)).
86. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010).
87. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998).
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used only as a last resort.88 Accordingly, before striking down a law, a
court will consider any limiting construction that is proffered.89
Vagueness and overbreadth challenges are frequently described as
overlapping theories capable of being analyzed concurrently.90
However, they are in fact two distinct doctrines.91 A law or regulation
is vague if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited92 or if it permits
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.93 In the context of laws
capable of suppressing speech, even greater specificity is required.94
The overbreadth doctrine provides for facial invalidation of laws that
prohibit a real and substantial amount of protected speech when
judged in relation to their overall scope.95
Overbroad laws risk deterring or “chilling” constitutionally
protected speech, especially when they impose criminal sanctions.96
The overbreadth doctrine permits a challenge to a law even though,
as applied to the defendant, the law is constitutional.97 The purpose is
to protect society, which, without an available remedy, would be
deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas. Otherwise, rather
than challenge the law, many individuals would simply abstain from
engaging in protected speech.98
Laws restricting political speech can also be vague99 or in violation
of the First Amendment as applied to certain speech.100 A plaintiff

88. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973); see also FW/PBS v. Dallas,
493 U.S. 215, 223 (1990) (“[F]acial challenges to legislation are generally
disfavored.”).
89. Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494 & n.5 (citing Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110).
90. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 479 (7th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Jordan v. Pugh, 425 F.3d 820, 827 (10th Cir. 2005)) (explaining that
vagueness and overbreadth challenges are “two sides of the same coin”).
91. See infra Part I.A.2.
92. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108.
93. Id.
94. See Hispanic Leadership Fund v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 1:12cv893, 2012
WL 4759238, at *16 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 2012) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566,
573 (1974)).
95. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
96. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003); see also Bates v. State
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
97. See, e.g., Hicks, 539 U.S. at 118 (citing Members of City Council of L.A. v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796 (1984)).
98. See id. at 119 (citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1965)).
99. See, e.g., Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 872–73 (1997).
100. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life (Wisconsin I), 546 U.S. 410, 411–
12 (2006).
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bringing a First Amendment challenge may argue that the law does
not meet the requisite level of scrutiny. For example, a law will be
deemed invalid where one can show that the government’s
justification is not sufficient as applied to the restricted speech or
conduct.101 A plaintiff may also argue that the law interferes with a
constitutionally protected right warranting heightened scrutiny and
that the law does not survive the heightened level of scrutiny. For
example, although disclosure laws are ordinarily reviewed under
exacting scrutiny, where compelled disclosure “seriously infringes on
privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First
Amendment” such that it would subject minority parties to “threats,
harassment, or reprisals,” the law will be reviewed under strict
scrutiny.102
B.

1.

Compelling Disclosure

The Interests in Compelling Disclosure

In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court recognized several
important governmental interests in compelled disclosure.103 First,
the public has an interest in knowing the sources of political campaign
money (“informational interest”).”104 The informational interest can
be parsed into several separate, but related, interests.
The
government has an interest in its people knowing which associations
support particular issues and candidates.105
Members of
organizations, shareholders, and stakeholders have an interest in
knowing about an association’s or a corporation’s campaign-related
speech.106 Finally, voters have an interest in knowing the sources of
contributions, which allows them “to place each candidate in the
political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the
basis of party labels and campaign speeches,” to determine which

101. Wisconsin II, 551 U.S. 449, 478–79 (2007) (holding that the government’s
interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of quid pro quo
corruption did not justify prohibiting use of corporate funds to finance corporation’s
issue-advocacy advertisements).
102. See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91–92
(1982).
103. 424 U.S. 1, 66–68 (1976).
104. Id. at 66.
105. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003), overruled
by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
106. See Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 882 (8th Cir.
2012) (Melloy, J., dissenting) (citing Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916).
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interests a candidate will most likely respond to,107 and who stands to
benefit from that candidate’s election.108 Second, the government has
an interest in “‘deter[ring] actual corruption and avoid[ing] the
appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and
expenditures to the light of publicity’”“”109 (“anti-corruption
interest”). In the disclosure context, this interest was most famously
summarized by Justice Brandeis, who stated that “[s]unlight is said to
be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman.”110 A different type of anti-corruption interest is that of
preventing the “corrosive and distorting effects” that result when
immense accretions of wealth by corporations are used for political
purposes unrelated to the public’s support for the corporation’s
political ideas (“anti-corporate corruption interest”).111 Third, the
government has an interest in being able to gather the data that is
necessary to detect circumventions of its laws.112

2.

The Interests in Avoiding Disclosure

The right to speak anonymously is recognized both in tradition113
and in legal precedent.114 The tradition harks back to long before our
nation’s founders published the Federalist papers under the
pseudonym “Publius.”115 Throughout history, many writers have used
pen names, including French enlightenment writer François-Marie
Arouet, who advocated for freedom of speech under the pen name

107. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67.
108. Family PAC v. McKenna, 685 F.3d 800, 808 (9th Cir. 2012).
109. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67. This interest, however, is not consistent with the
Supreme Court’s holding in Citizens United that “independent expenditures,
including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the
appearance of corruption” and, thus, is only relevant in the context of contributions
made directly to candidates. Swanson, 692 F.3d at 887 (Colloton, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909).
110. LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 92 (National Home Library
Foundation ed. 1933); see also Fed. Election Comm’n v. Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign, 533 U.S. 431, 456 (2001); Ill. Liberty PAC v. Madigan, No. 12 C 5811, 2012
WL 4764152, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2012) (discussing the “prophylactic” effect of
disclosure), aff’d, No. 12-3305, 2012 WL 5259036 (7th Cir. Oct. 24, 2012).
111. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003), overruled by
Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
112. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67–68.
113. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342–43 (1995).
114. See, e.g., id. at 357 (invalidating law prohibiting distribution of any
anonymous campaign literature); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960)
(invalidating law prohibiting distribution of anonymous handbills).
115. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342.
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Voltaire.116 The Supreme Court has recognized that anonymity
promotes the marketplace of ideas by permitting more speech and
providing a way for those who may be personally unpopular to ensure
that readers will not prejudge their message.117 Some scholars argue
that disclosure laws may actually harm the public, by decreasing the
quality of public discourse and encouraging “debate about the origins
of electoral messages rather than about their truth.”118 Anonymity
also protects persecuted groups that criticize the government from the
risk of oppression.119 It protects individuals who may fear retaliation
or social ostracism if they speak openly, or who may desire to
preserve their privacy.120
There are also several less noble reasons for wanting to remain
anonymous. Individuals and organizations may have an interest in
avoiding disclosure where they have a personal financial stake in the
outcome of an election or ballot initiative, particularly where
disclosing their identity would undermine their efforts to influence
the outcome.121 Corporations and individuals who serve as executives
or directors of corporations may have an interest in avoiding backlash
from shareholders or consumers for using general treasury funds to

116. See ROGER PEARSON, VOLTAIRE ALMIGHTY: A LIFE IN PURSUIT OF FREEDOM
406 (2005); see also McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341 n.2.
117. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342.
118. Johnstone, supra note 37, at 418 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
119. See Talley, 360 U.S. at 64.
120. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341–42.
121. As an example, in 2012 the people of Maryland voted on a referendum,
“Question 7,” to expand gambling with the proceeds earmarked for education. S. Bill
available
at
1,
2012
Leg.,
2nd
Special
Sess.
(Md.
2012),
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2012s2/bills/sb/sb0001e.pdf. A group called “Get the
Facts Vote No on 7” aired advertisements featuring teachers stating that they did not
believe that any of the proceeds would actually go towards education. Joy Resmovits,
Maryland Question 7 Pits Casino Against Casino in Debate on Education Dollars,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/12/
maryland-question-7-ads_n_1961672.html. It was later revealed that an owner of
rival casinos in neighboring states contributed substantially to “Get the Facts Vote
No on 7.” Id. FEC Commissioner Weintraub argued that knowing that the rival
casino owner was a major sponsor of those advertisements would have affected how
some Maryland voters credited those ads. See Open Meeting of the Federal Election
Commission (Oct. 12, 2012), available at http://www.fec.gov/audio/2012/
2012100407.mp3 (statement of Commissioner Weintraub). Thus, it would follow that
the organization receiving the contribution would benefit from not disclosing that
donor’s identity.
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support issues or candidates not supported by their shareholders or
consumers.122
Candidates and outside groups also may have an interest in the
names of donors contributing to outside groups remaining
anonymous. The promise of anonymity makes it more likely that
groups producing controversial, but nevertheless effective, attack ads
will receive donations.123 With adequate funding for outside groups to
do the heavy lifting, candidates are able to preserve their integrity by
focusing on positive messaging and staying “above the fray.”124
Anonymity also provides controversial figures with the ability to
spend substantial sums to influence an election without risking harm
to the reputation of the candidate or candidates that they support.125
Controversial donations, even when they are made to outside groups,
can reflect negatively on candidates.126 In some cases, the threat of
negativity is such that candidates have rejected or redirected such

122. See, e.g., Jennifer Martinez & Tom Hamburger, Target Feels Backlash from
Shareholders, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010
/aug/19/nation/la-na-target-shareholders-20100820; Brian Bakst, Target Apologizes
for Political Donation to Group Supporting Anti-Gay Candidate, HUFFINGTON POST
(Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/05/target-apologizes-forpol_n_672167.html.
123. At least one group has used the promise of anonymity as a selling point to
potential donors. See W. Tradition P’ship v. Att’y Gen. of State, 271 P.3d 1, 7 (Mont.
2011) (reciting excerpts from Western Tradition Partnership’s 2010 Election Year
Program Executive Briefing), cert. granted, judgment rev’d sub nom. on other
grounds, Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).
124. See Meredith McGehee, Unlimited Contributions to Parties Would Be
Disastrous, HILL’S CONGRESS BLOG (Oct. 10, 2012, 2:00 PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/campaign/261261-unlimited-contributions-toparties-would-be-disastrous#ixzz2HbS9F73h. In 2012, both presidential candidates
deplored the use of negative ads in the months leading up to the election. Julie Pace
& David Espo, Romney, Obama Bemoan Attack Ads, but Both Benefit,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 9, 2012, 7:08 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/obamapushes-economic-fairness-ad-draws-derision.
125. For example, in 2012 it was revealed that Clayton Williams Energy, Inc.
donated one million dollars to the Super-PAC American Crossroads. Clayton
Williams Energy Inc.’s chairman of the board, president, and chief executive officer is
Clayton Williams, Jr. Williams, a former Texas Republican gubernatorial nominee,
lost the election after he made deplorable comments defending rape. See Josh Israel,
Karl Rove’s Super PAC Accepts $1 Million From Notorious Rape Defender, THINK
PROGRESS (Sept. 21, 2010, 9:26 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/election/2012/
09/21/887631/karl-roves-super-pac-accepts-1-million-from-notorious-rape-defender.
126. See, e.g., Bill Maher’s Obama SuperPAC Donation Causing Stir, NPR (Mar.
28, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/03/28/149512215/bill-mahers-obamasuperpac-donation-causes-stir.
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donations.127 In addition, anonymity protects the reputation of
elected candidates post-election by preventing the media from
scrutinizing possible special favors to individuals or groups that
contributed large undisclosed sums supporting a candidate.
C.

The Evolution of the Federal Election Campaign Act: From
Buckley to Citizens United

This section briefly examines the development of campaign finance
jurisprudence over the past half-century. This overview helps to
explain how some of the current loopholes in the federal regulations
came to fruition and what Congress was attempting to solve when it
enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA). It
also provides a backdrop for understanding why the FEC
Commissioners and lower courts are divided over how much
disclosure the federal and state governments can require.
In 1974, Congress responded to serious misuses of campaign funds
during the 1972 Presidential election campaign by amending the
FECA. The amendments provided for increased disclosure, imposed
hard limits on contributions to and expenditures by candidates, and
created the FEC. Two years after its passage, the Supreme Court
evaluated several provisions of the FECA in Buckley v. Valeo.128 The
Court reviewed the limits on contributions and expenditures under
strict scrutiny, upholding the former while simultaneously striking
down the latter.129 In upholding the contribution limits, the Court
found that the government’s anti-corruption interest was sufficiently
compelling to justify a limit on contributions to candidates and that
the limits were narrowly tailored to that interest.130 The Court then
reviewed the disclosure requirements. The Court found that, unlike
limits on candidates’ expenditures, which constituted “direct and
substantial restraints on the quantity of political speech,” the
disclosure requirements “impose[d] no ceiling on campaign-related

127. See, e.g., Alexander Burns, Brown Donates Clayton Williams Money to AntiDomestic Violence Group, POLITICO (Aug. 21, 2012, 6:30 PM),
http://www.politico.com/blogs/burns-haberman/2012/08/brown-donates-claytonwilliams-money-to-antidomestic-132750.html. In 2012, Senator Brown donated
$1,000 to an anti-domestic violence group out of an “abundance of caution” after it
was revealed that the Senator may have received a $1,000 donation from Clayton
Williams, Jr. in 2010. Id.
128. 424 U.S. 1, 6 (1976).
129. Id. at 64.
130. See id. at 29. But see McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 1242
(2013) (agreeing to reconsider this holding).
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activities” and thus should be reviewed under exacting scrutiny.131
The Court upheld the requirements, finding that they were
sufficiently justified by important governmental interests.132
Before upholding the disclosure requirements, however, the Court
narrowed several terms in order to avoid vagueness concerns.133 The
Court narrowed the term “political committees” (defined as any
group of persons receiving contributions or making expenditures
exceeding $1,000 in a calendar year)134 to encompass only those
groups that were “under the control of a candidate or whose major
purpose was the nomination or election of a candidate.”135 The Court
construed the term “contributions” to encompass only direct or
indirect contributions to candidates, political parties, or campaign
committees, and contributions earmarked for political purposes or
made in cooperation or with the consent of a candidate, his agent, or
his authorized political committees.136 The Court narrowed the term
“expenditure” to encompass only those funds that were used for
communications that “expressly advocate[d]” for the election or
defeat of a “clearly identified candidate.”137 These communications
included those using the words “vote for, elect, support, cast your
ballot for, Smith for Congress, vote against, defeat, or reject,”138 later
referred to as the “magic words” test.139
The Court intended to create a bright-line distinction between
groups that were “directly and intimately” involved in the election
process and groups that were less involved.140 The effect, however,
was that the Court unintentionally provided groups seeking to avoid
131. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39, 64.
132. See id. at 68, 85; see also supra Part I.B.1 for a description of these three
interests.
133. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 76–78.
134. See id. at 222.
135. Id. at 79 n.107.
136. Id. at 78. The FECA defined “contribution” as donations made “for the
purpose of influencing the nomination for election, or election.” 2 U.S.C. §
431(e)(1)(A) (1976). Individuals were prohibited from making contributions
exceeding $1,000 and were required to report all contributions exceeding $100. See
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79 n.107.
137. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80. The FECA defined “expenditure” as spending “for
the purposes of . . . influencing the nomination . . . or election” of a candidate. 2
U.S.C. § 431(f) (1976).
138. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52.
139. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 126 (2003), overruled in
part by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
140. JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33794, GRASSROOTS LOBBYING:
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 9 (2007).
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disclosure requirements with a clear manual on how to do so. Groups
easily circumvented disclosure requirements by replacing the words
“vote for” or “vote against” with “call [candidate’s name] and tell her
what you think.”141 By omitting Buckley’s “magic words,” groups
were able to use misleading names to conceal their identities from the
public.142
In 2002, Congress enacted the BCRA143 in order to close the
loopholes that the Court’s narrow reading of several of the terms
within the FECA created.144 Congress found that the effectiveness of
campaign-related ads on influencing elections bore little relation to
whether the ads used Buckley’s “magic words.” Congress further
found that many of the ads eschewing the “magic words” aired within
sixty days of an election, were specifically designed to influence
elections, and that spending on these communications had increased
drastically over the past decade.145 To close this loophole, Congress
added “electioneering communication” (“EC”) to the category of
regulable campaign-related activities.146 In addition, the newly
amended FECA prohibited corporations and unions from using
general treasury funds to pay for ECs or express advocacy.147 If a
corporation or union wanted to engage in express advocacy or ECs, it
had to establish a political action committee (“PAC”) funded by a
segregated account. PACs were subject to limits and restrictions on
the sources from which they could receive contributions.148

141. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 127.
142. Id. at 128 (“‘Citizens for Better Medicare,’ for instance, was not a grassroots
organization of citizens, as its name might suggest, but was instead a platform for an
association of drug manufacturers. And ‘Republicans for Clean Air,’ which ran ads
in the 2000 Republican Presidential primary, was actually an organization consisting
of just two individuals—brothers who together spent $25 million on ads supporting
their favored candidate.”).
143. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
(codified in scattered sections of 2, 8, 18, 28, 36, and 47 U.S.C.). The BCRA
amended the FECA. See id.
144. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act § 203.
145. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 127 & n.20. Congress found that, “in the final two
months before the 2000 election, 94% of all televised issue ad spots were seen as
making a case for or against a candidate.” 107 CONG. REC. S2136 (daily ed. Mar. 20,
2002) (statement of Sen. Snowe) (discussing findings of Annenberg report).
146. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act § 203.
147. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act §§ 201–14. Prior to the BCRA’s enactment,
the FECA made it “unlawful . . . for any corporation whatever, or any labor
organization, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with” certain
federal elections. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006).
148. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4) (2006); 11 C.F.R. § 114.10(h)(2013).
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In 2003, less than one year after the BCRA was enacted, the
Supreme Court upheld the BCRA’s disclosure requirements in
McConnell v. FEC. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that
speech that fell outside of the scope of Buckley’s “magic words” test
could not be regulated.149 The Court also upheld the restriction on
the use of corporate and union general treasury funds to pay for
ECs,150 reasoning that the restrictions were permissible since the vast
majority of ads that fell within the EC definition clearly had the
purpose or effect of influencing voters’ decisions,151 and, thus, were
“the functional equivalent of express advocacy.”152
Four years later in Wisconsin II, the Supreme Court reviewed a
challenge to a restriction on the use of general treasury funds to pay
for ECs as applied to a nonprofit corporation’s advertisements.153
Before the Court could examine the constitutionality of the
restriction, however, it had to determine whether the plaintiff’s
proposed communications fell within the scope of the provision—
whether they were the functional equivalent of express advocacy.154
The Court held that the functional equivalent of express advocacy
encompassed only those communications that were “susceptible of no
reasonable interpretation other than an appeal to vote for or against a
specific candidate.”155 The Court determined that the ads were not
the functional equivalent of express advocacy because they expressed
an opinion on a legislative issue, encouraged viewers to reach out to
their representatives in order to press them to adopt a position, did
not mention anything related to an election, and took no position on
any candidates’ qualifications for office.156

149. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 102–03. In upholding the provisions, the Court quoted
the lower court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs’ gave no satisfactory answer as to how
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open speech” could occur when plaintiffs used
misleading names to obscure their identities from the public. Id. at 197.
150. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 203.
151. Id. at 206.
152. Id. In reaching its holding, the Court reasoned that because it had previously
found that a ban on general treasury funds to pay for express advocacy was
constitutional, a similar ban on ECs was also valid to the extent that they were the
functional equivalent of express advocacy. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 203–09.
153. Wisconsin II, 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
154. Id. at 456.
155. Id. at 451. This is the “appeal to vote” test.
156. Id. at 451–52. The ads declared that a group of senators had filibustered to
prevent the appointment of several federal judges and urged viewers to contact
Wisconsin senators and tell them to oppose the filibuster. Id. at 449.
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The Court then reviewed the restriction on corporate and union
use of general treasury funds to finance certain campaign activity
under strict scrutiny157 and found that the government did not have a
compelling interest in restricting the use of the nonprofit
corporation’s general treasury funds for the advertisements in
question.158 The Court first noted that it had previously found only
that the government’s anti-corruption interest was sufficiently
compelling to justify limits on contributions to federal candidates and
independent expenditures that were the functional equivalent of
express advocacy.159 The Court then reasoned that, because the
proposed advertisements were not the functional equivalent of
express advocacy, the government lacked a compelling interest to
limit the corporation from using its general treasury funds to pay for
the ads.160
Although Wisconsin II did not address BCRA’s disclosure
requirements, it served as the catalyst for the FEC’s decision to revise
its rules.161 In 2007, the FEC issued a notice of proposed rulemaking
to revise rules governing ECs in order to incorporate the Court’s
holding in Wisconsin II.162 In addition, the Commission proposed
revising disclosure requirements to accommodate reporting by
corporations and union organizations using general treasury funds to
finance ECs.163 Commentators urged the Commission to promulgate
an exemption for corporations and labor organizations from reporting
the sources of their general treasury funds.164 They argued that
general treasuries were largely comprised of funds received by those
who did not necessarily support the organization’s ECs, and that
requiring disclosure would be “costly and require an inordinate
amount of effort.”165 The FEC’s inquiry focused on whether any
useful information would come from such disclosure166 and whether
157. See id. at 476–77.
158. Id. at 452.
159. See id. at 478–81.
160. Id. at 481.
161. See Electioneering Communications: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 72 Fed.
Reg. 50,261–01 (Aug. 31, 2007).
162. See generally Electioneering Communications, 72 Fed. Reg. 72,899, 72,899–
72,901 (Fed. Election Comm’n Dec. 26, 2007).
163. Electioneering Communications, 72 Fed. Reg. 50,261, 50,271 (Fed. Election
Comm’n Aug. 31, 2007).
164. Electioneering Communications, 72 Fed. Reg. at 72,910.
165. Id. at 72,911.
166. See Transcript of Record at 167–68, In re Electioneering Communications
Notice 2007-16 (Fed. Election Comm’n Oct. 17, 2007), available at
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broad disclosure would interfere with donors’ interests in remaining
anonymous.167 Neither the commentators nor the FEC considered
whether the adopted revisions would create a loophole in the
reporting requirements.168 Ultimately, the FEC revised its disclosure
rules “to require corporations and labor organizations to disclose only
the identities of those persons who made a donation aggregating
$1,000 or more specifically for the purpose of furthering ECs made by
that corporation or labor organization,”169 thus mirroring the
disclosure rules for express advocacy.170
In 2010, the Court again reviewed the BCRA’s restriction on
corporations’ and labor organizations’ use of their general treasury
funds to pay for express advocacy or ECs in Citizens United v. FEC,
and this time struck it down.171 ’After Congress enacted the BCRA,
the FEC had promulgated a safe-harbor provision that used a twopart, eleven-factor balancing test to define certain permissible ECs
that corporations and unions could produce using general treasury
funds.172 In reviewing the ban and the correlative safe-harbor
provision, the Supreme Court deemed the FEC’s multi-factor test a
prior restraint.173 The Court found that a PAC was a separate
http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/electioneering_comm/2007/ec_hearing_finaltranscript10
-17-07.pdf (statements of Comm’r Weintraub and Donald Simon, Counsel,
Democracy 21).
167. Electioneering Communications, 72 Fed. Reg. 72,899, 72,901 (Fed. Election
Comm’n Dec. 26, 2007).
168. See Audio recording: Open Meeting of the Fed. Election Comm’n (Oct. 4,
2012), available at http://www.fec.gov/audio/2012/2012100407.mp3 (explaining how
the intent of the Commission was not to undermine the laws that it was trying to
implement) (statement of Comm’r Weintraub). According to a report from Public
Citizen, the percentage of groups disclosing the financiers of their ads fell from nearly
100% before Wisconsin II to less than 50% in 2008 and to just over a 33% in 2010. In
2010, groups making ECs disclosed the sources for just 23.3% of the money that was
spent on ECs. The top ten electioneering groups disclosed only 10.8% of money
spent. Id. See generally Electioneering Communications, 72 Fed. Reg. at 72,899–
72,901.
169. Electioneering Communications, 72 Fed. Reg. at 72,911 (emphasis added).
170. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 62–63 (1976).
171. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (overruling
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) and partially
overruling McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)). The Court held
that requiring a corporation or union to speak through a separate entity was an
“outright ban” on speech. Id. at 337.
172. See 11 C.F.R. § 114.15 (2013), invalidated by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 .
173. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 335. There is a strong presumption against the
constitutionality of prior restraints. 2 RODNEY SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON
FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 15:2 (1994). The canon was derived from sixteenth and
seventeenth century English laws that conditioned speech upon first obtaining a
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association and thus did not allow the corporation to speak.174
According to the Court, even if a PAC did allow a corporation to
speak, it was a “burdensome alternative” and, therefore, the option to
form one did not diminish First Amendment concerns.175
The Court also reviewed a challenge to the disclosure requirements
for ECs and voted 8-1 to uphold them,176 finding that the
informational interest alone was sufficient to justify the disclosure
requirements.177
The Court expressly rejected the petitioner’s
contention that the Constitution required disclosure requirements to
be confined to speech that is the functional equivalent of express
advocacy as it had done in Wisconsin II in the context of restrictions
on independent expenditures.178 Justice Kennedy, who authored the
opinion, lauded the disclosure requirements, calling them “an
effective means” of providing the public with the information
necessary to “hold corporations and elected officials accountable,”
and to determine whether elected officials were “‘in the pocket’ of socalled moneyed interests.”179
Notwithstanding Justice Kennedy’s proclamation, the Supreme
Court was not tasked with determining whether the FECA’s
provisions were an effective means of bringing about meaningful
disclosure. Rather, those duties are assigned to Congress and the
FEC. In fact, several of the Supreme Court’s decisions inadvertently
created some of the easily exploitable loopholes in the BCRA that
have since undermined the law’s efficacy.180 Although some public
officials were quick to recognize and express concern over the

license, and which are seen as being at odds with the principles of the First
Amendment. See Taucher v. Rainer, 237 F. Supp. 2d 7, 12 (D.D.C. 2002). The Court
cited the complex web of regulatory rules and explanations that, when coupled with
the deference that courts give to agency decisions, practically required organizations
to receive prior consent from the agency before speaking, if it wanted to avoid the
risk of criminal liability and costly legal fees. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 335.
174. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337–38.
175. Id. (“[PACs] are expensive to administer and subject to extensive regulations.
For example, every PAC must appoint a treasurer, forward donations to the
treasurer promptly, keep detailed records of the identities of the persons making
donations, preserve receipts for three years, and file an organization statement and
report changes to this information within 10 days.”).
176. Id. at 316.
177. See id. at 369.
178. Id. at 368–69.
179. Id. at 370 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court also found that the
Internet made disclosure both “rapid and informative.” Id.
180. See infra Part II.A.2.a.
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possible effects of the Supreme Court’s decisions,181 Congress and the
FEC have yet to act.182 As a result, organizations have found and
have been able to exploit a myriad of loopholes in the FECA and its
related regulations.183
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE FEDERAL DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS
A. The Current Federal Disclosure Requirements
Under the FECA, organizations are separated into two
categories—those that are subject to continued reporting and
disclosure requirements, and those that are subject to more limited,
event-driven requirements. A political organization must register
with the FEC as a PAC if a candidate controls it or if it accepts
contributions or makes expenditures aggregating more than $1,000 in
a calendar year and has as its “major purpose” the “nomination or
election of a [federal] candidate.”184 In addition to extensive
disclosure requirements, PACs are also subject to contribution
limits185 and restrictions on the types of sources from which they can
receive contributions.186 PACs making only independent
expenditures187 (more commonly known as Super PACs), however,
181. See, e.g., State of the Union Address, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 8 (Jan.
27, 2010).
182. See Trevor Potter, President, Campaign Legal Ctr., Address to the Annual
Meeting of the American Law Institute
(May 23, 2012), available at
http://www.campaignlegalCenterorg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i
d=1739:may-24-2012-trevor-potter-addresses-the-campaign-finance-crisis-in-speechto-the-american-law-institute-annual-meeting&catid=63:legal-center-pressreleases&Itemid=61; see also David M. Herszenhorn, Campaign Finance Bill Is Set
Aside, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2010, at A14 (discussing Congress’s inability to pass the
DISCLOSE Act). The FEC did put out a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on
December 27, 2011 after two previous attempts failed. Independent Expenditures
and Electioneering Communications by Corporations and Labor Organizations, 76
Fed. Reg. 80,803-01 (proposed Dec. 27, 2011). Comments were submitted and a
hearing was held on March 7, 2012. Id. The FEC has yet to take any further action.

Id.
183. See, e.g., Interview by Bill Moyers with Trevor Potter, President, Campaign
Legal Ctr. (PBS television broadcast Nov. 16, 2012), available at
http://billmoyers.com/segment/trevor-potter-on-fighting-big-money-in-the-2012election.
184. 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A) (2006).
185. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a.
186. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 110.4, 114.2, 115.2 (2013).
187. An independent expenditure is “an expenditure . . . for a communication
expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate that is not
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are exempt from these limits and restrictions,188 but are not exempt
from the disclosure and reporting requirements.189 To comply with
the disclosure regulations, PACs must register,190 designate a
treasurer191 and committee bank account,192 maintain records for
receipts and disbursements,193 report independent expenditures,194 and
file periodic disclosure reports revealing the source of every
contribution exceeding $100 and the recipient and purpose of every
expenditure over $100.195 If the PAC wants to cease filing disclosure
reports, it must first file a termination report or a written statement
with the FEC.196
Individuals and all other organizations that are not PACs—e.g.,
non-profit organizations that fall within § 501(c)(4) (social welfare
organizations), § 501(c)(5) (unions), and § 501(c)(6) (trade
associations) of the Internal Revenue Code—need only file disclosure
statements with the FEC when they purchase “electioneering
communications”197 or advertisements that expressly advocate for the
election or defeat of a candidate.198
Electioneering Communications (ECs) are defined as

made in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of,
a candidate, a candidate’s authorized committee, or their agents, or a political party
or its agents.” 11 C.F.R. § 100.16(a).
188. See SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(holding that FECA provision limiting contributions by individuals that made only
independent expenditures that expressly advocated the election or defeat of a
candidate, violated First Amendment free speech rights); Commonsense Ten, A.O.
2010-11, 2010 WL 3184269 (Fed. Election Comm’n July 22, 2010) (extending the
court’s holding in SpeechNow.org to apply to corporations, labor organizations, and
PACs); Club for Growth, A.O. 2010-09, 2010 WL 3184267 (Fed. Election Comm’n
July 22, 2010) (same).
189. See Commonsense Ten, A.O. 2010-11, 2010 WL 3184269 (Fed. Election
Comm’n July 22, 2010); Club for Growth, A.O. 2010-09, 2010 WL 3184267 (Fed.
Election Comm’n July 22, 2010).
190. See 11 C.F.R. § 102.1.
191. See 11 C.F.R. § 102.2(iv).
192. See 11 C.F.R. § 102.2(vi).
193. See 11 C.F.R. § 102.8.
194. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 104.3(b)(3)(vii)(A)(2013), 104.4(a)–(f)(2013), 109.10(c).
195. 11 C.F.R. § 104.5(c). PACs that are not authorized committees of candidates
may file quarterly or monthly reports.
196. See 11 C.F.R. § 102.3(a)(1).
197. See 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(b).
198. See Coordinated Communications and Independent Expenditures, FED.
ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/indexp.shtml (last updated
Jan. 2013).
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any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that: (1) [r]efers to
a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; (2) [i]s publicly
distributed within 60 days before a general election for the office
sought by the candidate; or within 30 days before a primary or
preference election . . . and (3) [i]s targeted to the relevant
electorate.199

Once an individual or organization spends more than $10,000 in the
aggregate on ECs, it must, within twenty-four hours, file a report with
the FEC that includes the date and title of the communication, the
name and address of any donor contributing $1,000 or more since the
first day of the previous year for the purpose of furthering ECs, and
the name and address of officers, directors, and the executive director
of the organization.200 Subsequent reports must also be filed for any
additional ECs aggregating in an additional excess of $10,000 in the
same calendar year.201
Express advocacy is defined as any communication that uses
phrases similar to Buckley’s “magic words” or that could only be
interpreted as advocating the election or defeat of a candidate.202
Once the total cost of express advocacy with respect to a given
election exceeds $250, an individual or organization must file a report
disclosing the identity of any payee, the candidate supported or
opposed, and the name, address, employer and occupation of any
donor who gave more than $200 during the year for the purpose of
making independent expenditures.203 In addition, individuals and
organizations must file additional reports when their aggregate
independent expenditure spending exceeds certain amounts during
election periods.204
B.

1.

The Inadequacies of the Federal Requirements

Various Ways of Avoiding Disclosure Under the FECA

The FECA limits the amount that individuals and organizations
can contribute to candidates and PACs that coordinate with or
contribute to candidates. If individuals want to make unlimited

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

11 C.F.R. § 100.29(a).
11 C.F.R. § 104.20.
11 C.F.R. § 104.20.
11 C.F.R. § 100.22(a)-(b).
11 C.F.R. § 109.10(b).
11 C.F.R. §§ 104.4(b)(2), (c), 109.10(b).
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contributions or expenditures for campaign-related activity,205 they
have three options: they can make non-coordinated expenditures,206
contribute to Super PACs or non-PAC organizations,207 or create a
shell corporation which can be used to funnel money to various
organizations.208 If an individual wants to pay for independent
expenditures or ECs, he will have to disclose his identity once he
spends more than the threshold amount.209 If an individual instead
prefers to pool his money with others, thereby delegating control to
organizations with more political savvy, he may donate unlimited
funds to a Super PAC or non-PAC organization.210
If the individual contributes to a Super PAC, however, his identity
will be disclosed if he contributes more than $100 in a calendar year.211
Likewise, if he contributes to a non-PAC organization, his identity
will be disclosed if he gives more than $250 for the purpose of making
independent expenditures or $1,000 for the purpose of furthering
ECs.212 If, instead, the individual would prefer not to have his identity
revealed, he can donate unlimited funds for general use to a non-PAC
organization.213 His identity will also not be revealed if the non-PAC
organization receiving his contribution elects not to pay for express
advocacy or ECs, but instead uses the contribution to make its own
contribution to a Super PAC or a non-PAC organization. This
indirect contribution is generally referred to as “campaign money
laundering,”214 which is perfectly legal under federal laws.215

205. The proceeding analysis also would apply to non-PAC organizations,
corporations, and labor unions.
206. See The FEC and the Federal Campaign Finance Law, FED. ELECTION
COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/fecfeca.shtml (last updated Jan. 2013).
207. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., Justin Sink, Colbert Creates Shell Corporation to Lampoon Karl
Rove’s Groups, HILL BLOG (Sept. 30, 2012, 10:31 AM), http://thehill.com/video/inthe-news/184755-colbert-creates-shell-corporation-to-lampoon-rove-moneylaundering.
209. See supra notes 200–01, 203 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 207.
211. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 200, 203 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., Emily’s List v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 581 F.3d 1, 16 n.15 (D.C. Cir.
2009).
214. Andy Kroll, California’s Biggest “Campaign Money Laundering” Scheme,
Revealed—Kinda, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/
mojo/2012/11/california-americans-responsible-leadership-donation-jerry-brown.
215. See Interview by Bill Moyers with Trevor Potter, President, Campaign Legal
Ctr.
(PBS
television
broadcast
Sept.
21,
2012),
available
at
http://billmoyers.com/segment/trevor-potter-on-fighting-big-money-in-the-2012-
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If the individual is particularly concerned about privacy, he can set
up a shell corporation using an obscure name, preferably
incorporated, in a state that requires minimum disclosure.216 Once
established, anyone can funnel unlimited funds through the shell
corporation either to a Super PAC or to a non-PAC organization.
Since Super PACs and other organizations must only disclose the
immediate sources of their funding, the only information revealed will
be that of the shell corporation.217 If the individual is absolutely
determined to hide his identity, he can “create structures that
resemble the corporate equivalent of matrushka dolls” by funneling
money through multiple legal entities.218

2.

The Effect of Splits on Disclosure

At present, the FEC Commissioners are divided evenly over what
constitutes express advocacy and electioneering communications, and
over what types of activity qualify a group as a PAC. The effect of
these splits is that the agency lacks the four votes necessary to
commence enforcement proceedings against groups that, according to
three of the Commissioners, are engaged in express advocacy, ECs, or
that qualify as PACs, but have not complied with the requisite
disclosure requirements.219

a.

Defining Express Advocacy

The FEC is split over whether it acted outside of its statutory and
constitutional authority in promulgating and continuing to enforce it’s
definition of “express advocacy” under § 100.22(b).220 The FEC
promulgated subsection (b) in 1995 after two courts held that express

election/. However, in some states, such action is illegal. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE
§ 84302 (West 2012).
216. See Leslie Wayne, How Delaware Thrives as a Corporate Tax Haven, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/business/how-delawarethrives-as-a-corporate-tax-haven.html.
217. See, e.g., Freedom Works for America, Report of Receipts and
Disbursements (FEC Form 3X) at 169–72 (Dec. 6, 2012), available at
http://images.nictusa.com/pdf/285/12941445285/12941445285.pdf (showing $5,300,000
in year-to-date aggregate contributions by Specialty Group, Inc.).
218. Ellen L. Weintraub & Samuel C. Brown, Following the Money: Campaign
Finance Disclosure in India and the United States, 11 ELECTION L.J. 241, 264 (2012).
219. See generally infra Part II.A.2.b.i–iii.
220. See generally 11 C.F.R. § 100.22 (2013). Section 100.22 defines express
advocacy. Section 100.22(a) lists phrases including those referenced by the Supreme
Court in Buckley that, if used, would constitute express advocacy.
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advocacy extended beyond the “magic words” of Buckley. First, in
FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the Supreme Court held that
a detachable voter guide listing the names of pro-life candidates next
to the words “Vote Pro-Life” was express advocacy.221 The Court
reasoned that the fact that the communication was marginally less
direct than Buckley’s magic words was not dispositive where the
message supplied “in effect an explicit directive” to vote for the
named candidates.222 The following year, the Ninth Circuit held in
FEC v. Furgatch that a newspaper ad criticizing the president,
published three days before the presidential election, and asserting
“DON’T LET HIM DO IT” was express advocacy.223 The Court
reasoned that express advocacy included words not listed by the
Supreme Court in Buckley which, “when read as a whole and with
limited reference to external events, [were] susceptible of no other
reasonable interpretation than an exhortation to vote for or against a
specific candidate.”224 The FEC subsequently revised § 100.22, adding
to the list of examples of express advocacy in subsection (a)225 and
adopting subsection (b), which incorporates the language of Furgatch
practically verbatim.226
Shortly after the FEC implemented § 100.22(b), several courts
found it invalid on constitutional and statutory grounds.227 As a result

221. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 249–50 (1986).
222. Id. at 249.
223. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 864–65 (9th Cir. 1987). The
advertisement also stated, “If [the President] succeeds the country will be burdened
with four more years of incoherencies, ineptness and illusion.” Id. at 858.
224. Id. at 864.
225. Notice 1995-10: Express Advocacy; Independent Expenditures; Corporate
and Labor Organization Expenditures, 60 Fed. Reg. 35292, 35293, 35295 (July 6,
1995). Section 100.22(b) provides that express advocacy means communications that
[w]hen taken as a whole and with limited reference to external events, such
as the proximity to the election, could only be interpreted by a reasonable
person as containing advocacy of the election or defeat of one or more
clearly identified candidate(s) because—(1) The electoral portion of the
communication is unmistakable, unambiguous, and suggestive of only one
meaning; and (2) [r]easonable minds could not differ as to whether it
encourages actions to elect or defeat one or more clearly identified
candidate(s) or encourages some other kind of action.
11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) (2013).
226. Notice 1995-10: Express Advocacy; Independent Expenditures; Corporate
and Labor Organization Expenditures, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,292, 35,295 (Fed. Election
Comm’n July 6, 1995) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 100, 106, 109, 114).
227. See Va. Soc’y for Human Life v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 263 F.3d 379, 392
(4th Cir. 2001); Right to Life of Dutchess Cnty. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 6 F. Supp.
2d 248, 253–54 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Me. Right to Life Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
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of these decisions, the FEC ceased enforcement of § 100.22(b) in
those circuits that held it invalid.228 In McConnell, the Supreme Court
clarified by stating that Buckley’s limiting construction was “a
product of statutory interpretation, not a constitutional command.”229
In light of the Supreme Court’s pronouncement, the Fourth Circuit in
Real Truth About Abortion v. FEC reversed course,230 and the FEC
resumed enforcement of § 100.22(b).231
FEC Commissioners McGahn, Hunter, and Peterson believe that
subsection (b) is unconstitutionally vague.232 Commissioner McGahn
makes two interrelated points. First, he maintains that § 100.22(b) is
unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it reaches speech that is
not express advocacy as the Supreme Court defined it in Buckley.233
McGahn reads McConnell as only upholding the EC provisions to the
extent that the speech being regulated is the functional equivalent of
express advocacy.234 He believes that the Supreme Court only upheld
the EC provision regulating speech that was the functional equivalent
of express advocacy because the provision contained objective
triggers, which are missing from the express advocacy provision.235

914 F. Supp. 8, 13 (D. Me. 1996), aff’d, 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Fed.
Election Comm’n v. Christian Action Network, 894 F. Supp. 946, 958–59 (W.D. Va.
1995), aff’d, No. 95-2600, 1996 WL 431996(4th Cir. Aug. 2, 1996).
228. See Nat’l Def. Comm., A.O. 2012-27 Draft A, at 25 (Fed. Election Comm’n
Aug. 24, 2012).
229. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 103 (2003), overruled by
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see id. at 278 n.11
(Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (noting that the Court had essentially overruled every
Court of Appeals that had addressed the issue except the Ninth Circuit).
230. 681 F.3d 544, 550 n.2 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 841 (2013).
231. See Nat’l Def. Comm., A.O. 2012-27 Draft A, at 29 (resuming enforcement of
§ 100.22(b) in order to “fill[] the gaps left by the Supreme Court between express
advocacy in Buckley and Mass. Citizens for Life and the functional equivalent of
express advocacy in ECs in McConnell” (citation omitted)).
232. See id. at 9.
233. DONALD F. MCGAHN, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, MUR 5831 (Softer Voices),
STATEMENT OF REASONS OF COMMISSIONER DONALD F. MCGAHN 27 & n.132 (2011),
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/48130178/Mur-5831-Softer-Voices-McgahnSor-Final.
234. Id. at 8 & n.36.
235. Id. at 26 & n.120 (discussing how the “appeal to vote” test is not “freefloating” and is only triggered if speech meets additional bright-line requirements).
The Seventh Circuit appeared to lend some support to this argument, noting, in
upholding a state EC provision against a vagueness challenge, that the law was
limited by the same five factors—medium, total amount spent, time, geography, and
content—as the law that was upheld in Wisconsin II. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom
v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 485 (7th Cir. 2012).
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Secondly, McGahn asserts that, even if subsection (b) could
constitutionally regulate speech that was not express advocacy or its
functional equivalent, it would still be unconstitutional because it is
inherently vague.236 He believes that subsection (b) contains several
terms that are inherently vague and inconsistent with each other, such
as the requirement that the FEC consider the communication “taken
as a whole” as well as its “electoral portion.”237 McGahn argues that,
unlike the EC provision, subsection (b) invites the FEC to consider
“rough-and-tumble” factors, such as contextual references and
general proximity to the election, that the Court ordered the agency
to eschew, and which are sufficiently similar to the two-part elevenfactor test that the Supreme Court struck down in Citizens United.238
Commissioners McGahn, Hunter, and Peterson further argue that
the agency lacks the jurisdictional capacity to act. They contend that
McConnell did not overrule prior decisions invalidating subsection
(b) on statutory grounds.239 They then further contend that the
Fourth Circuit in Real Truth About Abortion never addressed the
FEC’s statutory authority and, thus, did not overrule prior cases
within its jurisdiction invalidating § 100.22(b) on statutory grounds.240
Commissioner McGahn reasons when the Supreme Court stated that
Buckley’s interpretation was “the endpoint of statutory

236. MCGAHN, supra note 233, at 12–14. But see Real Truth About Abortion v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 681 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 841
(2013); Transcript of Oral Ruling, Free Speech v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 12-CV127-SWS (D. Wyo. Oct. 3, 2012), appeal docketed, No. 12-8078 (10th Cir. Oct. 19,
2013), available at http://www.fec.gov/law/litigation/freespeech_dc_transcript.pdf.
237. MCGAHN, supra note 233, at 12–14.
238. Id. at 17 & n.70.
239. Nat’l Def. Comm., A.O. 2012-27 Draft A, at 29 (citing N.M. Youth Org. v.
Herrera, 611 F.3d 669 (10th Cir. 2010); N.C. Right to Life v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274 (4th
Cir. 2008); Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655 (5th Cir. 2006);
Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2004); Am. Civil Liberties Union of Nev. v.
Heller, 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2003)). The Commissioners point to several court
decisions holding that Buckley’s magic words requirement “was not altered by
McConnell and remains a viable way to cure an otherwise vague statute.” Id.
240. See CAROLINE C. HUNTER ET AL., FED. ELECTION COMM’N, STATEMENT ON
A.O.
2012-11
(FREE
SPEECH),
at
4
n.8
(2012),
available
at
http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/1209339.pdf (listing Right to Life of Dutchess Cnty. v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 6 F. Supp. 2d 248, 253–254 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Me. Right to Life
Comm’n. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 914 F. Supp. 8, 13 (D. Me. 1996), aff’d, 98 F.3d 1
(1st Cir. 1996); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Christian Action Network, 894 F. Supp. 946,
958 (W.D. Va. 1995), aff’d, 92 F.3d 1178 (4th Cir. 1996) (unpublished)).
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construction,”241 it spoke to the issue and the FEC should not secondguess the Court. He argues that, even if the FEC had the authority to
promulgate subsection (b), which he believes it did not, in order to
properly revive it, the FEC would have had to utilize Notice and
Comment Rulemaking.242
Moreover, McGahn, Peterson, and Hunter point out that when
Congress amended the FECA in 2002, it did not grant the FEC
authority to expand the definition of express advocacy. Contrariwise,
Congress considered and ultimately rejected an amendment that
would have expanded the definition of express advocacy due to
concerns over its constitutionality.243 They assert that, at the time of
the BCRA’s enactment, several members of Congress believed that §
100.22(b) was unconstitutional and were aware that the FEC was not
enforcing it.244 They argue that, by refusing to expand the definition
of express advocacy, Congress, at a minimum, accepted the
preexisting construction.245 In short, they believe the FEC should
cease enforcing the regulation in order to avoid enmeshing itself in
“‘serious statutory and constitutional questions’ raised by intercircuit
nonacquiescence.”246 and that complete abandonment of the rule in
all jurisdictions is necessary given the increased use of media to target
national audiences without regard for jurisdictional boundaries.247

241. MCGAHN, supra note 233, at 28 (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 126 (2003) overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
242. See id. at 8 n.35. The Commissioner, however, cites cases indicating that there
is a split among the circuit courts over this issue. Id.
243. Free Speech, A.O. 2012-11 Draft A, at 11–12 (Fed. Election Comm’n Apr. 12,
2012).
244. See MCGAHN, supra note 233, at 30. McGahn makes the point that, although
the FEC had stated that it would cease enforcement only in those circuits that had
found it unconstitutional, the practical effect of its policy was that the FEC ceased
enforcement in all jurisdictions. Id.; see also Free Speech, A.O. 2012-11 Draft A, at
15.
245. Free Speech, A.O. 2012-11 Draft A, at 15.
246. See Nat’l Def. Comm., A.O. 2012-27 Draft A, at 32 (Fed. Election Comm’n
Aug. 24, 2012). Intercircuit nonacquiescence occurs when the court that ordinarily
reviews the agency’s action has not addressed a question, but a sister circuit has, and
the federal agency refuses to acquiesce to the sister circuit’s precedent. Ross E.
Davies, Remedial Nonacquiescence, 89 IOWA L. REV. 65, 71 (2003). Generally,
courts will not find fault with such a position where the nonacquiescing party
reasonably believes that it might prevail. See id. 71 & n.15.
247. Nat’l Def. Comm., A.O. 2012-27 Draft A, at 34–35 (arguing that enforcement
in only those jurisdictions that have upheld § 100.22(b) would “subject [such
advertising] to inconsistent regulatory standards[,]” forcing speakers to retain a
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Nevertheless, without the four votes necessary to cease
enforcement, Commissioners McGahn, Peterson, and Hunter
continue to construe § 100.22(b) narrowly.248 They believe that,
because § 100.22(b) follows the court’s holding in Furgatch, the FEC
should adhere to the central holding of Furgatch, which, according to
these Commissioners, was that express advocacy must contain some
explicit words of advocacy.249 They believe that the FEC should find
that speech is not express advocacy if “any reasonable alternative
reading of speech can be suggested.”250 These Commissioners reject
the test used by the other three Commissioners, calling it “inherently
vague” and prone to the same constitutional infirmities described by
the Court in Wisconsin II251 and claiming further that such a test
would cause some communications to qualify as both independent
expenditures and as ECs, which is prohibited by the FECA and
creates a filing conundrum for speakers.252
Under these three Commissioners’ interpretations of § 100.22(b),
the following two advertisements do not constitute express advocacy.
Advertisement 1 states: “[Candidate X] has been one of the least
effective members of Congress. This fall, let’s make history by
changing that. Learn about HR 3638.”253 Advertisement 2 states:
“Military voting matters. That’s why [Candidate X] is such a
disappointment . . . . [S]houldn’t military voices and votes matter?
Shouldn’t yours? Be heard this fall.”254 Why? Nothing in the
advertisements “explicitly inform[s] the listener that there is an
election coming up or associate[s] the communication’s message with
a federal campaign.”255 The fact that listeners may be aware that an
campaign finance attorney, conduct demographic marketing research, or seek
declaratory rulings before speaking, in violation of the First Amendment).
248. Id. at 9.
249. Free Speech, A.O. 2012-11 Draft A, at 9 (reasoning that the Ninth Circuit
emphasized that the words “don’t let him” were a simple and direct command to vote
against the candidate). Section 100.22(b) omits the second “clear plea for action”
standard from the three-part standard set forth in Furgatch. Id. at 9 n.6.
250. Id. at 9.
251. See id. at 20.
252. See id. at 17–18; see also 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(B)(ii) (2006) (the term
“electioneering communication” does not include “a communication which
constitutes an expenditure or an independent expenditure under this Act”); 11 C.F.R.
§ 100.29(c)(3) (2013) (any communication that “[c]onstitutes an expenditure or
independent expenditure provided that the expenditure or independent expenditure
is required to be reported under the Act or Commission regulations” is not an EC).
253. Nat’l Def. Comm., A.O. 2012-27 Draft A, at 13.
254. See id. at 17.
255. Id. at 13.
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election is coming does not make the communication electoral in
nature.256 Moreover, even if part of the advertisement included an
unambiguous reference to the election, reasonable minds could still
differ as to whether the advertisement exhorts the election or defeat
of a candidate,257 as opposed to encouraging individuals to contact the
candidates, protest outside of their office, or write letters to the
editors of local newspapers.258
On the other hand, Commissioners Weintraub, Walther, and
Bauerly259 believe that § 100.22(b) is constitutional and that the FEC
has the requisite authority to enforce it. They reason that McConnell
foreclosed any debate as to whether express advocacy could
constitutionally encompass speech that falls outside of the scope of
Buckley’s magic words.260 Moreover, they believe that the test in
subsection (b) is practically identical to the “appeal to vote” test,
which the Supreme Court upheld in Wisconsin II in that it employs
objective and restrictive criteria.261 Finally, they argue that any
lingering doubts regarding § 100.22(b)’s constitutionality should have
been eliminated post-Citizen’s United, since the regulation now acts
solely as a trigger for disclosure requirements and no longer as a ban
on certain types of speech.262 Proponents of this viewpoint also stress
that the Supreme Court’s two most recent decisions expressly reject
attempts to limit the scope of express advocacy to Buckley’s magic

256. Id. (citing Brief of Appellees FEC and U.S. DOJ at 41, Real Truth About
Abortion v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 681 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 841 (2013)).
257. Id. at 14 (quoting 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) (2013)).
258. See id. at 18.
259. Commissioner Bauerly resigned from the FEC on February 1, 2013. Bauerly
Departs Federal Election Commission, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION (Feb. 1, 2013),
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2013/20130201_BauerlyDeparture.shtml.
260. See Free Speech, A.O. 2012-11, at 2 (Fed. Election Comm’n) (Weintraub et
al., concurring) (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 189–94
(2003), aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); id. at 278 n.11 (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
261. Nat’l Def. Comm., Comments on A.O. Request 2012-27, at 4–5 (Fed. Election
Comm’n Aug. 6, 2012), available at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/
attachments/CLC__D21_Comments_on_AOR_201227_Nat__Def__Comm__8_6_12.pdf (emphasizing that § 100.22(b) uses a similar
reasonability requirement and mandates that a communication be unambiguous).
262. See id. at 4.
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words,263 or to limit disclosure to the functional equivalent of express
advocacy.264
There are two primary arguments that can be made in support of
the position that the FEC has the requisite authority to enforce
subsection (b). First, when Congress codified the term “expressly
advocating,” it made no attempt to define or limit it.265 Thus, in
promulgating subsection (b), the FEC lawfully exercised its
administrative duty to “prescribe rules [and] regulations . . . to carry
out the provisions of [FECA].”266
The Supreme Court’s
interpretation of express advocacy in Buckley did not foreclose any
subsequent agency interpretation. The Supreme Court has stated
that “a court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an
agency construction entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior
court decision holds that its construction follows from the
unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency
discretion.”267 Because Congress did not speak directly to the issue,
the proper question for the reviewing court is whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible interpretation of the statute.268
Second, when Congress amended the FECA in 2002, it was aware
of the potential constitutional issues surrounding § 100.22(b).269
Although Congress could have acted to limit the agency’s authority to
interpret express advocacy, it did not. Additionally, out of an
abundance of caution and in part due to an inability to come to an
agreement over the EC provision, eighty-two Senators voted to adopt
an amendment that essentially acted as a fail-safe device if the EC
provision was subsequently invalidated.270 The amendment’s sponsor,

263. Id. at 4 (citing Wisconsin II, 551 U.S. 449, 470 (2007)).
264. See, e.g., Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 54 (1st Cir. 2011),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1635 (2012).
265. See Brief of Appellee Federal Election Commission at 39, Free Speech v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, No. 12-8078 (10th Cir. Feb. 4, 2013).
266. Id. at 39–40 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(8) (2006)).
267. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982
(2005) (emphasis added). The Court reasoned that allowing a judicial precedent to
foreclose any subsequent agency interpretation would undermine Chevron’s basis,
which was that it is the primary responsibility of agencies, not courts, to fill statutory
gaps. Id.
268. See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).
269. See, e.g., 11 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM
ACT OF 2002, at 82–98 (William H. Manz ed., 2003).
270. The fail-safe provision provides:
If [the provision defining ECs] is held to be constitutionally insufficient by
final judicial decision to support the regulation provided herein, then the
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Senator Arlen Specter, explained that the fail-safe provision was a
streamlined version of the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Furgatch.271
Thus, by adopting the Furgatch approach as an alternative to the EC
provision, Congress implied that it believed that Furgatch was
constitutional. Even more tellingly, Senator Specter explained that
the final sentence of the amendment, which provides that “nothing in
this subsection shall be construed to affect the interpretation or
application of 11 C.F.R. [§] 100.22(b),” referred to the “the current
FEC regulation.”272
From the perspective of Commissioners Weintraub, Walther, and
Bauerly’, each of the advertisements described above contains
unmistakable and unambiguous election portions, and no reasonable
person could find that those portions do not urge defeating or voting
against the candidates in the fall election273 and, therefore are
regulable pursuant to subsection (b).274 They refute the other three
Commissioners’ contention that the final sentence of the first
advertisement (“Learn about HR 3638”) alters the nature of the
entire ad, finding instead that it simply makes an additional point.275

b.

Defining an Electioneering Communication

The FEC is also divided over the proper interpretation of the
provision defining “clearly identified” as it pertains to ECs in 11
C.F.R. § 100.29. Prior to Congress’s enactment of the BCRA, the
term “clearly identified,” which was used in the independent
expenditure provision was defined in 2 U.S.C. § 431(18) and in 11

term “electioneering communication” means any broadcast, cable, or
satellite communication which promotes or supports a candidate for that
office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office (regardless of
whether the communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a
candidate) and which also is suggestive of no plausible meaning other than
an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate.
2 U.S.C. § 434 (2006).
271. 141 CONG. REC. S3118-23 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2001). The provision omitted the
words “unmistakable” and “unambiguous.” Id.
272. Id.
273. Nat’l Def. Comm., A.O. 2012-27 Draft B, at 5, 7 (Fed. Election Comm’n Aug.
23, 2012).
274. Id. at 5, 7. The Commissioners were deadlocked over whether several other
advertisements constituted “express advocacy.” See Free Speech, A.O. 2012-11 Draft
A, at 7–9.
275. Nat’l Def. Comm., A.O. 2012-27 Draft B, at 5.
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C.F.R. § 100.17.276
After the BCRA was enacted, the FEC
promulgated a rule adopting the pre-existing definition of “clearly
identified” for use in the context of ECs.277
Commissioners McGahn, Peterson, and Hunter argue that
Congress intended the provisions to be “narrow, objective, and clear”
in order to avoid the same type of vagueness concerns that caused the
Court in Buckley to narrowly construe the FECA provisions278 and
that both Congress and the FEC intended the language to mean the
same thing in the context of independent expenditures and ECs.
Accordingly, these Commissioners found that the following three
advertisements constituted ECs. In the first advertisement, a
voiceover attributed the United States’ dependence on foreign oil to
“the Administration,” and “the White House,” while an image of the
White House was displayed on the screen. The ad concluded by
informing viewers to “call the White House at (202) 456-1414” and
“[t]ell [them] it’s time for an American energy plan . . . that actually
works for America.”279
The second advertisement omitted any reference to the
Administration and the White House, instead referring to “the
government.” The advertisement featured images of the White
House and the Washington Monument and included a recording of
the President stating “[w]e must end our dependence on foreign
oil.”280
The third advertisement used the words, “Secretary Sebelius,” “the
Government,” “the Administration,” and displayed footage of the
White House, while a voiceover instructed viewers to “[c]all Secretary

276. 2 U.S.C. § 431(18) (2006) (“The term ‘clearly identified’ means that—(A) the
name of the candidate involved appears; (B) a photograph or drawing of the
candidate appears; or (C) the identity of the candidate is apparent by unambiguous
reference.”); 11 C.F.R. § 100.17 (2013) (“The term clearly identified means the
candidate’s name, nickname, photograph, or drawing appears, or the identity of the
candidate is otherwise apparent through an unambiguous reference such as ‘the
President,’ ‘your Congressman,’ or ‘the incumbent,’ or through an unambiguous
reference to his or her status as a candidate such as ‘the Democratic presidential
nominee’ or ‘the Republican candidate for Senate in the State of Georgia.’”).
277. 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(b)(2) (2013).
278. Am. Future Fund, Statement of Commissioner Donald F. McGahn on A.O.
2012-19, at 6, (Fed. Election Comm’n June 7, 2012).
279. Am. Future Fund, A.O. 2012-19 Draft A, at 3–4, 9 (Fed. Election Comm’n
June 7, 2012).
280. Id. at 6.
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Sebelius [and] tell her it’s wrong for her and the Administration to
trample the most basic American right.”281
Why? According these Commissioners, all three advertisements
discuss the executive branch, which consists of many agencies and
officials who are not candidates for reelection.282 They argue that the
definition of “clearly identified” does not include use of audio of a
candidate’s voice and, therefore, absent permissible reference to the
speaker, a recording of a candidate’s voice does not clearly identify
the candidate.283 These Commissioners also maintain that reaching an
alternative conclusion regarding the terms “administration” and
“White House” would lead to an absurd result, transforming ads
exhorting viewers to contact their representatives to support the
administration on legislative issues into express advocacy.284
Commissioners Weintraub, Walther and Bauerly would reach the
opposite result.285 According to these Commissioners, Congress, in
enacting the BCRA, “intended to broaden the reach of the Act
beyond communications that contain express advocacy or its
functional equivalent.”286
They argue that references to the
Administration” are “merely short-hand” for the President.287 In
addition, they maintain that the contention that some listeners might
not recognize a candidate’s voice is “highly improbable” given that
the President’s voice is “widely recognized” and is also irrelevant
because the analysis is supposed to be objective.288 Furthermore, they
contend that any ambiguity caused by the third advertisement’s
reference to Secretary Sebelius is clarified by the footage of the
White House.289

281. Id. at 7.
282. Id. at 5–9.
283. See id. at 6–7.
284. Id. at 5–6 (arguing that, finding that “Administration” of “White House”
referred to a clearly identified candidate, would mean that, advertisements stating:
“Support the White House” would constitute in determining express advocacy since
they combine one of Buckley’s magic words with a reference to a clearly identified
candidate).
285. See Am. Future Fund, A.O. 2012-19 Draft B, at 3 (Fed. Election Comm’n
June 7, 2012).
286. Am. Future Fund, Concurring Statement on A.O. Request 2012-19, at 1 (Fed.
Election Comm’n June 13, 2012).
287. American Future Fund, A.O. 2012-19 Draft B, at 4–6.
288. Id. at 6; see also Am. Future Fund, Concurring Statement on A.O. Request
2012-19, at 1–2 (Fed. Election Comm’n June 13, 2012).
289. See American Future Fund, A.O. 2012-19 Draft B, at 8.
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The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia reviewed
advertisements that were “essentially identical” to those reviewed by
the FEC and came to a different conclusion—that the first and third
advertisements were ECs, but that the second advertisement was
not.290 The court looked to the references that were made in the
context of the advertisement as a whole291 and found that references
to the White House and Administration, while discussing the policies
of the current President and displaying images of the White House,
were “clear[ly] . . . being used as synonyms for the President,” and,
thus, unambiguous references to the current President.292 Concerning
the third advertisement, the court found that the use of the term
Administration, while displaying footage of the White House,
distinguished the Secretary from the Administration, making it clear
to viewers that Administration referred to the President.293 The court
found that the second advertisement was not an EC because there
was no evidence presented that “the average listener would recognize
the President’s voice simply by hearing an eight word sentence.”294

c.

Determining When an Organization Qualifies as a PAC

’Because the Commissioners do not agree on the proper definition
of express advocacy, they are at odds over when exactly an
organization exceeds the threshold spending amount under the first
prong of the test for determining when an organization qualifies as a
PAC.295 Even where the Commissioners agree that a group has met
the threshold requirement, they disagree over the proper test for
determining whether the major purpose of an organization is the
nomination or defeat of a Federal candidate (the second prong).
Commissioners McGahn, Peterson, and Hunter contend that the
other commissioners’ interpretation of the major purpose test
unconstitutionally exceeds the scope of the test as it was articulated in

290. Hispanic Leadership Fund v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 1:12CV893, 2012
WL 4759238, at *13 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 2012).
291. Id. at 13–15.
292. Id. at 13.
293. Id. at 14 (explaining that it is the President who “is the head of the
Administration and [] resides, and works, at the White House”).
294. Id.
295. Compare Free Speech, A.O. 2012-11 Draft A, at 50–52 (Fed. Election
Comm’n Apr. 12, 2012), with Free Speech, A.O. 2012-11 Draft B, at 22 (Fed.
Election Comm’n Apr. 12, 2012). The first prong for determining whether to impose
PAC status is whether a group makes contributions or expenditures aggregating in
excess of $1000 during a calendar year. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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Buckley.296

Commissioner McGahn argues that the FEC
impermissibly considers a group’s overall federal campaign activity
and its influence on federal elections.297 McGahn maintains that, by
refusing to promulgate a list of factors, the agency allows itself to
engage in the same sort of “intricate case-by-case determination” that
the Supreme Court rejected in Wisconsin II and Citizens United.298
These Commissioners believe that a group meets the major
purpose standard in only two situations.299 First, a group must register
as a PAC if its “central organizational purpose” is the election or
defeat of federal candidates.300 In determining a group’s central
purpose, the agency’s review should be limited to “official
statements, . . . organizing documents or statement of purpose, or
other materials put forth under the group’s name, including
fundraising documents or press releases. . . .”301 According to these
commissioners, prohibitions on express advocacy in a group’s bylaws
in conjunction with an official statement that the group “promotes
and protects free speech, limited government, and constitutional
accountability” constitutes “clear evidence of intent to focus on issues
and avoid electoral speech.”302
Second, a group qualifies as a PAC if it devotes more than half of
its spending to express advocacy.303 These three Commissioners
maintain that, in determining the proportion of overall spending that

296. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 240, at 23–24 n.71.
These three
Commissioners also argue that a case-by-case approach to ascertain PAC status fails
to give “practical guidance” to those wishing to comply with disclosure requirements,
and leaves speakers vulnerable to lengthy, burdensome investigations. Id.
Additionally, they argue that this ex post approach fails to provide organizations with
any way to determine when their first filing is due or what stretch of time the FEC
will review to determine its major purpose. Id.
297. See MCGAHN, supra note 233, at 39. McGahn argues that consideration of
these factors violates the District Court of the District of Columbia’s holding in FEC
v. GOPAC, which rejected the FEC’s argument that in order to meet the major
purpose test, “an organization need not support the ‘nomination or election of a
candidate,’ but need only engage in ‘partisan politics’ or ‘electoral activity.’” Id.
(quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. GOPAC, 927 F. Supp. 851, 861 (D.D.C. 1996)).
298. Id. at 43.
299. This approach mirrors the one taken by the Tenth Circuit in construing a state
statute. Cf. N.M. Youth Organized v. Hererra, 611 F.3d 669, 678 (10th Cir. 2010).
300. See Free Speech, A.O. 2012-11 Draft C, at 45 (Fed. Election Comm’n Apr. 26,
2012).
301. Id. at 48. These Commissioners believe that the FEC should not review
outside sources such as news articles and other unofficial statements. Id.
302. Id. at 49.
303. See id. at 45.
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is express advocacy, the FEC should not take into account ECs or
other documents, such as faxes and fundraising letters, which are not
express advocacy.304 Moreover, they argue that review should not be
limited to short time periods that could provide an “incomplete
picture” of a group’s central purpose.305
Commissioners Weintraub, Walther, and Bauerly believe that the
FEC is acting within its proper authority by taking a comprehensive
approach to determining major purpose status.306 In Buckley, the
Supreme Court articulated that the test was whether the group’s
major purpose is “the nomination or election of a candidate.”307 Since
then, the Court has not narrowed that definition or attempted to
delineate exactly what the FEC may consider when applying the
test.308 At a minimum, by later explaining that the “major purpose
may be regarded as campaign activity” or whether its “primary
objective is to influence political campaigns,” the Court signaled that
the test was not static.309 In fact, every court that has considered the
validity of the FEC’s multi-factor approach has upheld it.310
Proponents of the multi-factor approach maintain that it makes
sense from a policy perspective. They argue that disclosure that is
both effective and comprehensive is now even more paramount given
that individuals and entities can spend an unlimited amount of money

304. Id. at 51 (noting that the legislative history of the BCRA indicates that
members of Congress believed that organizations would be free to run ECs without
having to register and report as a PAC (citing 147 CONG. REC. S2813 (daily ed. Mar.
27, 2001) (statement of Sen. James Jeffords)).
305. Id. at 50 n.30. The Commissioners provided a hypothetical of a group that is
created in the middle of an election year and, thus, is primarily focused on election
related activities, but that intends to remain in existence after the election to focus on
non-election related activities. Id.
306. See Nat’l Def. Comm., A.O. 2012-27 Draft B, at 15–17 (Fed. Election
Comm’n Aug. 23, 2012).
307. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976).
308. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986); see
also Brief for Campaign Legal Center and Democracy 21 as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 29, Free Speech v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 2:1200127 (D. Wyo.
Oct. 3, 2012) (noting that the court in Shays v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 511 F. Supp.
2d 19 (D.D.C. 2007), approved the FEC’s approach and noted that “Buckley
established the major purpose test, but did not describe its application in any
fashion”), appeal docketed No. 12-8078 (10th Cir. Oct. 19, 2013).
309. See Mass. Citizens, 479 U.S. at 262.
310. See Brief for Campaign Legal Center, supra note 308, at 28–29 (discussing
Real Truth About Abortion v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 681 F.3d 544, 558 (4th Cir.
2012), cert denied, 133 S. Ct. 841 (2013); Shays, 511 F. Supp. 2d 19; and Fed. Election
Comm’n v. Malenick, 310 F. Supp. 2d. 230, 234 (D.D.C. 2004)).
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on campaign related activity.311 Moreover, such an approach does not
risk chilling speech in the same way that it did when the Supreme
Court first created it, since it no longer acts to ban or limit speech.312
In carrying out a multi-factor approach, Commissioners Weintraub,
Walther, and Bauerly consider a group’s “overall conduct,” including:
statements about its mission, the proportion of spending related to
federal candidate campaigns, and the extent to which fundraising
solicitations indicate funds provided will be used to support or oppose
specific candidates.313 The Commissioners compare the proportion of
spending on federal campaign activity (which is not limited to express
advocacy) with a group’s spending on activities that are not
campaign-related.314

d.

The Ensuing Effects on Disclosure

The effect of these Commissioners’ 3-3 splits is that the FEC lacks
the requisite votes to take action in any circumstance that falls
outside of the more narrow approach that Commissioners McGahn,
Peterson, and Hunter take. Thus, communications by non-PAC
organizations that do not use the magic words, or, when aired within
the relevant period before an election, do not refer to a candidate by
explicitly naming or displaying a picture of the candidate, will not be
required to disclose the sources of their contributions. Moreover, so
long as a group does not spend more than half of its money on
express advocacy (as narrowly defined by three of the
Commissioners) during the more extended time frame that those
Commissioners are likely to consider, it does not have to register as a
PAC, and thus will not be subject to more stringent disclosure
requirements.315
If an organization that seeks an advisory opinion from the FEC to
determine whether a proposed advertisement is express advocacy or
an EC, or whether it needs to register as a PAC, does not receive an
answer because the FEC lacks the requisite votes to issue an opinion,

311. See Brief of Appellee Federal Election Commission at 41–42, Free Speech v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 12-8078 (10th Cir. Feb. 4, 2013).
312. See id. at 43 (citing Real Truth, 681 F.3d at 549).
313. Political Comm. Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 5595, 5597, 5605 (Feb. 7, 2007) (to be
codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100).
314. See Free Speech, A.O. 2012-11 Draft B, at 25–28 (Fed. Election Comm’n Apr.
12, 2012) (citing Political Comm. Status, 72 Fed. Reg. at 5601, 5605).
315. See Free Speech, A.O. 2012-11 Draft C, at 55 (Fed. Election Comm’n Apr. 26,
2012).
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it has two options. The first option for the organization is to continue
its planned activity without adhering to disclosure or reporting
requirements, knowing that the FEC currently lacks the requisite
votes to bring an enforcement proceeding against it.316 If an
individual decides to challenge the organization for non-compliance
with its enabling statute, he first will have to file a complaint with the
FEC.317 Assuming that none of the Commissioners have changed
their viewpoints and that none of the members have been replaced,
the Commission will likely deadlock on whether the committee
violated the FECA, which will result in a dismissal of the complaint.318
The challenger can then dispute the Commission’s dismissal by filing
a petition with the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.319 The District Court then will request a statement from
the three Commissioners who voted to dismiss the complaint
providing their reasons for dismissal.320 The court will defer to the
three dissenting Commissioner’s decision unless it determines that the
agency’s action was “contrary to law.”321
The second option would be to seek a declaratory judgment from a
court enjoining the FEC from bringing an enforcement proceeding
against it in the future.322 The reviewing court will not defer to any of

316. Four votes are required for the FEC to act. See 2 U.S.C. § 437c(c) (2006).
317. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(1) (2006).
318. See Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 831 F.2d
1131, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
319. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(A); Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm., 831 F.2d
at 1133.
320. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm., 966 F.2d
1471, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
321. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(C); see Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm., 966 F.2d at
1476 (“Since [the dissenting Commissioners] constitute a controlling group for
purposes of the decision, their rationale necessarily states the agency’s reasons for
acting as it did.”). A decision is “contrary to law” if it is the result of an
“impermissible interpretation” of law or is otherwise “arbitrary or capricious or an
abuse of discretion.” Orloski v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 795 F.2d 156, 161 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
322. See Hispanic Leadership Fund v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 1:12CV893,
2012 WL 4759238, at *1–2 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 2012) (finding that plaintiff had standing
to seek declaratory judgment that its planned advertisements would not constitute
ECs after the FEC deadlocked and, thus, failed to issue an advisory opinion
regarding another committee’s advertisements that were “essentially identical” to the
plaintiff’s proposed advertisements); Carey v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 791 F. Supp. 2d
121, 125, 132–33 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding committee had standing to seek a
preliminary injunction to enjoin the FEC from enforcing provisions of the FECA
against it for its planned campaign activity after the FEC deadlocked and, thus, failed
to issue an advisory opinion regarding its planned activity).
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the Commissioner’s opinions, however, since the agency’s deadlock
over issuing an advisory opinion constitutes a final agency action.323
Thus, under this option, the organization will spend additional legal
fees obtaining a judgment that will not defer to those Commissioners
who believe that the proposed speech does not fall within one of the
regulable categories.
III. STATE ATTEMPTS TO GO BEYOND THE FEDERAL
REQUIREMENTS
Recognizing that the federal disclosure laws are unable to provide
meaningful disclosure, several states have enacted laws requiring
more extensive disclosure and reporting.324 States arguably have a
stronger interest than the federal government in requiring
disclosure.325 The Supreme Court has recognized that the Guarantee
Clause of the Constitution gives states broad power to define their
electorates.326 It follows, then, that states have the power, within the
confines of the Constitution, to regulate the influence of outside
groups on state election results.327
States and local municipalities are more vulnerable to the influence
of large factions than the federal government.328 Overall spending on
local election campaigns is generally much more limited than
spending on federal elections and, thus, outside groups spending large
amounts can influence election results more easily.329 Accordingly, a

323. See Hispanic Leadership Fund, No. 1:12CV893, 2012 WL 4759238, at *12
(finding no deference where FEC split 3-3 on whether to issue an advisory opinion).
324. See Tara Malloy, A New Transparency: How to Ensure Disclosure from
“Mixed-Purpose” Groups After Citizens United, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 425, 449 (2011).
325. See Patrick M. Garry et al., Raising the Question of Whether Out-of-State

Political Contributions May Affect A Small State’s Political Autonomy: A Case
Study of the South Dakota Voter Referendum on Abortion, 55 S.D. L. REV. 35, 40
(2010).
326. Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:
Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 37 (1988).
327. Cf. id. at 38 (noting the courts can affirm state control over state and local
election franchises by recognizing that this power is one aspect of republican
government promised to the states by the Guarantee Clause).
328. See Johnstone, supra note 37, at 466.
329. See Garry et al., supra note 325, at 40 n.32; Shane Goldmacher, Does Money
Talk in Congress? In 2012, It Screamed, NAT’L J. (Nov. 10, 2012, 9:43 PM),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/does-money-talk-in-congress-in-2012-itscreamed-20121108; Lauren Feeney, Dark Money in State and Local Elections, BILL
MOYERS WEEKLY Q&A (June 15, 2012), http://billmoyers.com/2012/06/15/darkmoney-in-state-and-local-elections (discussing how a local federal candidate lost an
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state’s citizens have a strong interest in knowing the extent of outside
spending’s influence. Outside spending that influences elections also
undermines the principles of horizontal federalism and state
sovereignty.330 Outside influence can interfere with states’ abilities to
serve as laboratories of experimentation and undercuts the notion
that the people vote with their feet.331 Increased outside spending can
also undermine constituents’ beliefs that state elected officials are
more likely to be responsive to their needs.332
A. Determining What the Supreme Court Said
Although they are few and far outnumbered, some courts have
concluded that Buckley’s narrowing of certain provisions of the
FECA was constitutionally required. Courts that have invalidated
state laws that failed to adopt the Supreme Court’s limiting
interpretation of several provisions of the FECA engaged in little if
no substantive analysis of whether the state law met exacting scrutiny.

1.

The Major Purpose Test

The federal “major purpose” test has created some odd results,
such as permitting large organizations that spend millions of dollars
on campaign-related activity to avoid being subject to the additional
PAC disclosure requirements just by ensuring that the organization’s
major purpose is not to nominate or elect a federal candidate.333
States, in an attempt to avoid similar results, have enacted laws that
either completely do away with the major purpose test or define
“major purpose” more broadly than federal law does.
In some instances, courts have read the major purpose test into
these statutes, insisting that it is necessary to avoid vagueness
concerns. In North Carolina Right to Life v. Leake, the Fourth
Circuit found that a state law imposing PAC status on any group that
“[h]as as a major purpose to support or oppose the nomination or

election where he had previously had a twelve-point lead after an outside group spent
$400,000 in the final days of the election campaign).
330. See Garry et al., supra note 325, at 46; see also Michael S. Greve, Federalism’s
Frontier, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 93, 99 (2002) (“Federalism rests on principles of state
autonomy and equality: each state governs its own territory and citizens but not, of
course, the territory and citizens of sister states.”).
331. See Garry et al., supra note 325, at 36–38.
332. See id.
333. See Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1635 (2012).
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election of one or more clearly identified candidates” was vague.334
The court reasoned that there could be only one purpose that was
“the major purpose” of an organization under Buckley’s construction,
whereas there could be several purposes that simultaneously could
constitute “a major purpose” of an organization under the state law.335
The court reasoned that, in the absence of any criteria as to when a
“purpose” becomes “a major purpose,” organizations lacked
sufficient notice as to when they could be designated as a PAC.336
The Tenth Circuit also read the major purpose requirement into two
state laws—one imposed PAC status on organizations that “operate
primarily” for a political purpose,337 and a second imposed PAC status
on “any group that spends more than $200 a year to support or
oppose the nomination or election of one or more candidates.”338
Other circuits have refused to invalidate or narrowly construe laws
on vagueness grounds merely because they fail to use “the major
purpose” test to determine PAC status. The Ninth Circuit upheld a
law imposing PAC status on a group “if one of its primary purposes is
to affect governmental decision-making by supporting or opposing
candidates or ballot propositions, and it makes or expects to make
contributions in support of or in opposition to a candidate or ballot
measure” against a vagueness challenge, reasoning that the test
provided “concrete, discernible criteria.”339 Other courts have upheld
state laws imposing PAC status once a group’s total amount of
expenditures or contributions exceeds a certain amount.340
State laws that alter or do away with the federal test for
determining PAC status have also been challenged on First
Amendment grounds. Lower courts are divided over whether a

334. N.C. Right to Life v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 323 (4th Cir. 2008). Note, however,
that organizations that met the state’s requirements were subject to both disclosure
requirements and limits on the amount of contributions they could receive. See Real
Truth About Abortion v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 681 F.3d 544, 553 (4th Cir. 2012).
335. Leake, 525 F.3d at 289 (explaining how a single organization could have
multiple purposes).
336. Id. at 290 (noting that the statute’s vagueness made it susceptible to abuse by
granting regulators’ broad, unguided discretion).
337. N.M. Youth Org. v. Herrera, 611 F.3d 669, 677 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 1-19-26(L)) (upholding as-applied challenge).
338. Colo. Right to Life Comm. v. Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137, 1152 (10th Cir. 2007).
In Coffman, the law at issue both imposed strict contributions and disclosure
requirements. See Malloy, supra note 324, at 448 (footnote omitted) (citation
omitted).
339. Human Life of Wash. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2010).
340. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464 (7th Cir. 2012).
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“major purpose” is constitutionally required under the First
Amendment and, if so, what constitutes a major purpose. Some
courts have read the “major purpose” test into state laws, finding that
without such a requirement, the laws run the risk of sweeping in a
substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech.341
Most courts, however, have dismissed such challenges, finding that
such laws are not overly broad merely because they impose PAC
status on organizations whose major purpose is not influencing
elections. Courts rely on three primary justifications for upholding
such laws. First, courts reason that the major purpose limitation that
Buckley created, like the “magic words” test, was a product of
statutory interpretation.342 Second, courts distinguish state laws that
deal purely with disclosure from the provision in Buckley, which
placed hard limits on the amount that individuals could contribute to
PACs and the sources from which PACs could receive contributions
in addition to disclosure requirements.343 They point to the Supreme
Court’s indication in Massachusetts Citizens for Life that, although
exempt from the limit on use of general treasury funds, an
organization would be subject to the FECA’s more extensive
disclosure requirements for PACs if its independent spending became
such that it was deemed to have as its major purpose the election or
defeat of a candidate.344 Thus, courts reason that although the major
purpose test may be required for laws imposing hard limits on
campaign contributions and expenditures, it is not mandated for laws
triggering additional disclosure requirements.345
Third, courts acknowledge that the major purpose test “yields
perverse results” by requiring small groups with limited spending to
register, while exempting larger groups that spend far more on

341. See Herrera, 611 F.3d at 677 (interpreting law requiring organizations that
“operate primarily” for the purpose of “influencing or attempting to influence an
election” to register as PACs as requiring that such organizations meet the major
purpose test as it was articulated in Buckley); Leake, 525 F.3d at 288–89. The law in
Leake, however, was distinguishable from the other state laws that failed to adopt the
federal standard. See Malloy, supra note 324.
342. See Madigan, 697 F.3d at 486–89 (7th Cir. 2012); Nat’l Org. for Marriage v.
McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 59 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1635 (2012);
Brumsickle, 624 F.3d at 1009–10; Vt. Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 875 F. Supp. 2d
376, 394 (D. Vt. 2012).
343. See, e.g., Madigan, 697 F.3d at 488 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 35
(1974)).
344. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 262 (1986).
345. See Madigan 697 F.3d at 488; Malloy, supra note 324, at 446–49.

EAGAN_AUTHOR APPROVAL (DO NOT DELETE)

5/27/2013 7:25 PM

DARK MONEY RISES

2012]

849

campaign-related activities.346 Courts recognize that limiting PAC
status to those groups that have “the major purpose of influencing
elections” would allow large groups to circumvent the law with ease
by either increasing non-campaign-related activities or by merging
with an organization that is not engaged in campaign-related
activities.347

2.

Express Advocacy and Its Functional Equivalent

Several states, in an attempt to avoid creating easily exploitable
bright-line distinctions between regulable and non-regulable speech,
have enacted laws compelling disclosure of communications
containing speech that would fall outside of Buckley’s “magic words”
test. Courts that have reviewed such laws can be separated into three
categories, ranging from least to most permissive.348 In the first
category, at least one court has found that a state law imposing
disclosure requirements on groups making expenditures for anything
other than express advocacy (as it was interpreted in Buckley) or ECs
(as they are defined in the FECA) was impermissibly vague.349 In the
second category are courts that have upheld disclosure requirements
for speech that meets the federal express advocacy requirements
found in § 100.22(a) and (b) against constitutional challenges.350 Also
in this category is one court that found that state disclosure
requirements for speech that is express advocacy or its functional
equivalent (as it was defined in Wisconsin II) were constitutional
even though the regulations were not further limited in the same ways
as the federal provision.351
In the final category are courts that have upheld language that is
arguably broader than the language found in § 100.22(b) and the

346. Madigan, 697 F.3d at 489 (quoting McKee, 649 F.3d at 59).
347. Id. at 489–90.
348. Since these cases involve situations where courts have either upheld
provisions or narrowed them in order to avoid vagueness concerns, however, they do
not hold that any additional disclosure extending beyond the courts’ interpretation
would be unconstitutional. See supra notes 89, 269 and accompanying text.
349. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655, 664 (5th Cir.
2006); N.C. Right to Life v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2008). But see Real Truth
About Abortion v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 681 F.3d 544, 553 (4th Cir. 2012)
(distinguishing Leake on the grounds that the law at issue imposed not just
disclosure, but also limits on contributions and expenditures).
350. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom, v. Tennant, 706 F.3d 270, 280–81 (2013).
351. Yamada v. Weaver, 872 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1045 (D. Haw. 2012) (indicating
that it was not clear that such a narrow reading was necessary).
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“appeal to vote” test. In State of Vermont v. Green Mountain
Future, the Vermont District Court narrowed the term “influence” to
mean “supporting or opposing one or more candidates.”352 Similarly,
in National Organization for Marriage v. McKee, the First Circuit
upheld the terms “support,” “oppose,” and “opposition,” which
appeared in several disclosure provisions.353
Although courts have been nearly unanimous in upholding such
terms, it remains unclear whether they are in fact vague, especially
when they are considered in the context of whole provisions.354
Lower courts upholding such language rely on McConnell, where the
Supreme Court, in a footnote, upheld a provision defining “public
communication” as a communication that “refers to a clearly
identified candidate for Federal office . . . and that promotes or
supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate
for that office.”355 That provision was more limited than some of the
state provisions, however, in that it required that the communication
“refer to a clearly identified candidate”356 and it applied only to state
party committees, whose actions are presumed to be coordinated with
federal candidates.357
State laws going beyond the federal requirements have also been
challenged on First Amendment grounds. Such challenges, however,
have been largely unsuccessful.358 While the Supreme Court has only
352. Vermont v. Green Mountain Future, No. 758-10-10, at 2–3 (Sup. Ct. Vt. June
available
at
http://www.vermontjudiciary.org/20112015%20
28,
2011),
Tcdecisioncvl/2011-6-30-1.pdf (defining “PACs” as any entity receiving contributions
or making expenditures over a threshold amount “for the purpose of supporting or
opposing one or more candidates, influencing an election, or advocating a position on
a public question in any election or affecting the outcome of an election.”).
353. Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 62–63 (1st Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1635 (2012).
354. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 332 (1988) (finding the term “peace”
was not vague as its definition was apparent from its context); see also Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agric. Prods., 473 U.S. 568, 593 (1985) (“A term that appears vague
on its face may derive much meaningful content from the purpose of the Act, its
factual background, and the statutory context.”).
355. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 184 (2003).
356. 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(iii) (2006).
357. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 503–04 (7th Cir.
2012) (Posner, J., dissenting) (explaining that the provision upheld in McConnell was
not vague). Judge Posner indicated that intent-based limitations, such as regulating
speech “made for the purpose of influencing,” promoting, opposing, etc., might be
sufficient to allow the provision to pass muster. Id. (emphasis added).
358. See Madigan, 697 F.3d at 484 n.17 (finding that “with just one exception every
circuit that has reviewed First Amendment challenges to disclosure requirements
since Citizens United has concluded that such laws may constitutionally cover more
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addressed whether “express advocacy” and “electioneering
communications” as they are defined by the FECA are valid, it has
never indicated that regulations may go no further.359
B.

Determining What Exactly Is Exacting Scrutiny

Courts reviewing state laws that require disclosure of activities not
addressed by the Supreme Court are forced to undergo a more
substantive analysis to determine and apply the appropriate standard
of review. A frequent challenge to state disclosure requirements is
that they are so burdensome that they act as a de facto ban on speech
and, thus, should be reviewed under strict scrutiny.360 Challengers
argue that the Supreme Court indicated in Citizens United that strict
scrutiny review was appropriate for laws that are “expensive to
administer and subject to extensive regulations,” such as those that
require an organization to appoint a treasurer, maintain detailed
records, and promptly file statements when information changes.361
Thus far, courts unanimously have rejected such attempts for two
reasons.362 First, lower courts are bound by the Supreme Court,363
which has held repeatedly that exacting scrutiny is the appropriate
level of review for disclosure laws.364 Second, the burdens that the
FECA imposed on corporations prior to Citizens United included
than just express advocacy and its functional equivalents”). The exception—the 10th
Circuit—invalidated disclosure requirements as applied to certain organizations. Id.
(discussing Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2010) and N.M. Youth
Org. v. Herrera, 611 F.3d 669, 677 n.4 (10th Cir. 2010)).
359. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Tennant, 849 F. Supp. 2d 659, 684–85
(S.D.W. Va. 2011), overruled on other grounds, 706 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 2013).
360. See Malloy, supra note 324, at 446.
361. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 337–38 (2010).
362. See SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 695–96 (D.C. Cir.
2010); Iowa Right to Life Comm. v. Tooker, 795 F. Supp. 2d 852, 865–67 (S.D. Iowa
2011); ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 830 F. Supp. 2d 914, 936 (E.D. Cal. 2011);
Yamada v. Kuramoto, No. 10-00497, 2010 WL 4603936, at *10 (D. Haw. Oct. 29,
2010).
363. Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 1307, 1308 (2012).
364. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67; McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
540 U.S. 93, 231–32 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310; Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64, 66, 96 (1976). The Eighth Circuit, however, indicated that it
did not believe that the Supreme Court intended exacting scrutiny to apply to
burdensome disclosure laws. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life v. Swanson, 692 F.3d
864, 874–75 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). But see id. at 881 (Melloy, J., dissenting)
(arguing that applying strict scrutiny to burdensome disclosure laws is “circular and
conclusory . . . requir[ing] a court to assess the burden of a disclosure law to
determine what level of scrutiny applies, then to evaluate that burden again under
exacting or strict scrutiny”).
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requirements that they create a separate association in order to speak
and placed limits on the types of sources that could contribute to the
separate association.365
While disclosure requirements generally are reviewed under
exacting scrutiny, the Court in Buckley indicated that monetary
thresholds triggering disclosure should be reviewed under rational
basis.366 As a result, some courts have reviewed thresholds separately
under rational basis.367
Three circuits have rejected this
interpretation, however, choosing instead to review thresholds under
exacting scrutiny.368
Although courts generally agree that exacting scrutiny is the
appropriate standard of review for disclosure requirements,369 they do
not agree completely as to what the standard requires.370 The
“exacting” standard was first articulated by the Court in United
States v. Carolene Products Co.,371 long before the Court first
articulated the “strict scrutiny” standard of review.372 Unlike strict
scrutiny and rational basis, exacting scrutiny does not presume the

365. See Swanson, 692 F.3d at 881 (Melloy, J., dissenting).
366. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 83 (finding that thresholds for record-keeping and
reporting were not “wholly without rationality”).
367. See Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. Daluz, 654 F.3d 115, 118–19 (1st Cir. 2011)
(applying rational basis); Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 60–61 (1st
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1635 (2012); Daggett v. Comm’n on Gov’t Ethics &
Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 466 (1st Cir. 2000) (applying rational basis); Vt.
Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 875 F. Supp. 2d 376 (D. Vt. 2012) (same); Bowen, 830
F. Supp. 2d at 944–45 (same). But cf. Family PAC v. McKenna, 685 F.3d 800, 809 &
n.7 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying exacting scrutiny to uphold $25 and $100 thresholds,
noting, “[i]t is far from clear, however, that even a zero-dollar disclosure threshold
would succumb to exacting scrutiny” and that “we are not aware of any decision
invalidating a contribution disclosure requirement, either facially or as applied to a
particular actor”).
368. See Swanson, 692 F.3d at 876; McKenna, 685 F.3d at 809; Canyon Ferry Rd.
Baptist Church of E. Helena v. Unsworth, 556 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 2009); see
also Iowa Right to Life Comm. v. Tooker, 795 F. Supp. 2d 852, 866 (S.D. Iowa 2011)
(stating that the disclosure provisions must be evaluated “as a whole”).
369. See Swanson, 692 F.3d at 881 (Melloy, J., dissenting) (describing the view held
by six members of the Eighth Circuit that the Supreme Court never intended that
exacting scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review for all disclosure laws).
370. James Bopp, Jr. & Josiah Neeley, How Not to Reform Judicial Elections:
Davis, White, & the Future of Judicial Campaign Financing, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 195,
225 (2008).
371. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64.
372. See Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and
Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 361 (2006) (discussing the birth of strict
scrutiny).
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law to be either constitutional or unconstitutional.373 Rather, exacting
scrutiny occupies the amorphous territory between the two clearer
standards. Perhaps in part due to the nature of the territory that it
occupies, for many years the standard was described or applied in a
consistent manner.374 The Supreme Court has referred to exacting
scrutiny as “the most exacting scrutiny,”375 “critical scrutiny,”376 a
“strict test,”377 and “the strictest standard of review.”378 In some cases,
the test has been described as being akin to strict scrutiny in that it
requires a “compelling interest” and the “least restrictive means.”379
More recently, the Court clarified the standard, explaining that the
test requires a “sufficiently important governmental interest” and a
“substantial relation” between the disclosure requirement and that
interest.380
Since the Supreme Court clarified the standard for exacting
scrutiny, lower courts have stated the correct standard consistently.381
In applying the standard, however, lower courts take divergent
approaches. These courts vary as to what evidence the government
must provide, if any, to show that the law is “substantially related” to
a “sufficiently important interest.”
Some courts have construed the Supreme Court’s assertions that
the burden is on the government to show that the interest advanced is
“paramount”382 and “reflect[s] the seriousness of the actual burden on

373. Johnstone, supra note 37, at 419–20.
374. Bopp & Neeley, supra note 370, at 225–26; see Minn. Citizens Concerned for
Life v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 304, 876 (8th Cir. 2011).
375. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2548 (2012) (plurality) (quoting
Turner Broad. Sys. v. Fed Commc’ns Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994)).
376. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786–87 (1978).
377. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976).
378. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347–48 (1995).
379. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2549, 2551.
380. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 366–67 (2010); accord
Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010).
381. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Tennant, 706 F.3d 270, 282 (4th Cir. 2013)
(exacting scrutiny requires a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement
and a sufficiently important governmental interest); Ctr. for Individual Freedom v.
Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 477 (7th Cir. 2012) (same); Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life
v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 874–75 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (same); Family PAC v.
McKenna, 685 F.3d 800, 805–06 (9th Cir. 2011) (same); Nat’l Org. for Marriage v.
Daluz, 654 F.3d 115, 118 (1st Cir. 2011) (same); SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (same).
382. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976).
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First Amendment rights”383 to mean that review of the government’s
justifications and the nexus between that interest and the disclosure
requirements is necessary. Other courts take a more deferential
approach, relying on the Supreme Court’s finding in Citizens United,
that the informational interest alone was sufficient in finding that
local governments have an important interest in compelling
disclosure.
With one exception, the standard that courts apply when reviewing
monetary thresholds appears to have little effect on the outcome.
Applying rational basis, the Ninth Circuit invalidated a zero-dollar
threshold reporting requirement for organizations, reasoning that
“the value of th[e] financial information to the voters declines
drastically as the value of the expenditure or contribution sinks to a
negligible level.”384 Two years later, applying exacting scrutiny, the
Ninth Circuit upheld $25 and $100 threshold disclosure thresholds,
noting that “[i]t [wa]s far from clear . . . that even a zero-dollar
disclosure threshold” would fail to meet the standard.385 The court
reasoned, “small contributions [could] provide useful information to
voters when considered in the aggregate.”386 A district court in the
Second Circuit applied rational basis, but indicated that exacting
scrutiny would “make little difference in the Court’s analysis of th[e]
disclosure threshold.”387 The sole exception, the Eighth Circuit, took
a less deferential approach to a $100 reporting and disclosure
383. Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 744 (2008) (citing Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68, 71 (1976)).
384. Canyon Ferry Rd. Baptist Church of E. Helena v. Unsworth, 556 F.3d 1021,
1033–34 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding Montana’s “zero dollar” reporting threshold “wholly
without rationality” because “[a]s a matter of common sense, the value of this
financial information to the voters declines drastically as the value of the expenditure
or contribution sinks to a negligible level” (emphasis omitted)); see also Sampson v.
Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247, 1261 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding $20 threshold for reporting
contributors’ names and addresses and $100 threshold for reporting names,
addresses, occupations, and employers were invalid under rational basis).
385. Family PAC v. McKenna, 685 F.3d 800, 809 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2011). The Court
distinguished the contribution disclosure threshold from the reporting thresholds in
Canyon Ferry and Sampson. Id. at 810 & n.10.
386. Id. at 810.
387. Vt. Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 875 F. Supp. 2d 376, 400–01 (D. Vt. 2012)
(citing McKenna, 685 F.3d at 809 & n.7). The court found that the law had a
“rational foundation” because its threshold was higher than that of twenty-eight
other states and lower than that of only five states and the federal government, and
that the law was not arrived at haphazardly because “the legislative history
reflect[ed] a concerted effort to adjust the amount over the years” and the lower
amount permitted transparency of considerably more contributions than a higher
amount would. Id. at 401.

EAGAN_AUTHOR APPROVAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

DARK MONEY RISES

5/27/2013 7:25 PM

855

threshold, scrutinizing the additional burdens that the low threshold
amount imposed on speakers.388

1.

Expanding the Definition of Electioneering Communications

State attempts to broaden the definition of ECs beyond the
requirements of federal law have received mixed reception in courts.
Courts disagree as to whether the government interests that the
Supreme Court recognized in Buckley and subsequent cases apply to
state laws that regulate more types of speech than the federal
provisions do and what, if anything, the government must show to
establish that the means are sufficiently tailored to those interests.
Courts in the Second and Eleventh Circuits have upheld such laws
without requiring any showing by the government that an important
interest was substantially related to the communications.389 For
example, in National Organization for Marriage v. Roberts, the
District Court upheld an electioneering communication disclosure
requirement that included newspapers, magazines, direct mail, and
telephone calls even though the only evidence offered in support of
the regulation was an article in a local newspaper describing the “no
holds-barred political brawl” that occurred during a period following
a court’s invalidation of the prior EC provisions.390
The Courts of Appeals in the Fourth and Seventh Circuits have
taken less deferential approaches. In Center for Individual Freedom
v. Madigan, the Seventh Circuit upheld a state law including Internet
speech within its definition of ECs, but only after noting that there
was information in the record indicating that the major parties’
spending on online communications in 2012 was expected to increase

388. See Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 871–72 (8th
Cir. 2012) (en banc).
389. Sorrell, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 381, 390–91, 397–400 (ECs included items like
billboards, posters, pamphlets, and robotic phone calls); Nat’l Org. for Marriage v.
Roberts, 753 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1219 (N.D. Fla. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Org. for
Marriage v. Sec’y, State of Fla., 477 F. App’x 584 (11th Cir. 2012) (ECs included
newspapers, magazines, direct mail, and telephone calls). In Sorrell, the district court
found that the laws were properly tailored and the burdens (requiring the sponsor to
send the Secretary a one-page form and then provide a photocopy of the report to
any candidates who appeared in the activity) were minimal. Sorrell, 875 F. Supp. 2d
at 398.
390. See Defendant’s Memo in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 1–2, Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. Roberts, 753 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (N.D. Fla.
2010) (No. 1:10-cv-00192-SPM-GRJ), 2010 WL 4632649. The court made no
reference to any legislative findings, nor were any provided by counsel. See generally
Roberts, 753 F. Supp. 2d 1217.
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sevenfold from the prior election,391 and that in 2008, more than half
of the voting-age population went online to get involved in or learn
about the Presidential campaign.392
In Center for Individual Freedom v. Tennant, the Fourth Circuit
took a less deferential approach than the Seventh Circuit when it
struck down part of a state law expanding the definition of ECs to
include “materials published in any newspaper, magazine, or other
periodical.”393 The court found that the state could rely on the
informational interest as it was articulated in Buckley to justify
regulating print communications.394 In determining whether the
means were adequately tailored to the informational interest, the
court looked to codified statements of the legislature’s intent as well
as materials in the court’s record.395 The court found that the text of
the statute and affidavits on the record “provide[d] ample support for
including newspapers, magazines, and other periodicals [in the state’s
EC] definition.”396 Moreover, the court found that regulating print
communications furthered the state’s interest, regardless of how little
money was actually spent on print ECs.397 Nevertheless, the court
determined that the state had not provided any rationale for
regulating some forms of non-broadcast media but not others such as
direct mailings.398 Consequently, the court found the regulation was
underinclusive and, thus, invalid.399
391. Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 492 (7th Cir. 2012)
(citing Jen Christensen, Obama Outspends Romney on Online Ads, CNN (June 3,
2012,
11:20
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/03/politics/online-campaignspending/index.html).
392. See id. (citing Aaron Smith, The Internet’s Role in Campaign 2008, PEW
INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.pewresearch.org/
pubs/1192/internet-politics-campaign-2008.aspx).
393. Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Tennant, 706 F.3d 270, 283–85 (4th Cir. 2013).
394. Id. at 282–83.
395. See id. at 284–85. The Court noted that there was “little, if any, formal
legislative history.” Id. at n.4.
396. Id. at 284. The court noted that “the statute explicitly mention[ed] the
legislature’s fear that ‘[f]ailing to regulate non-broadcast media would permit those
desiring to influence elections to avoid the principles and policies that are embodied
in existing state law’” and that the “affidavits clearly support[ed] the informational
purpose that the [state] legislature enunciated.” Id.
397. Id. at 284–85. Information on the record revealed that as little as 0.4% of
third-party spending financed print communications. Id.
398. Id. at 285.
399. Id. Earlier versions of the statute included direct mailings, telephone banks,
and billboard advertising, but the legislature had removed them following the District
Court’s determination that the state could not regulate non-broadcast media. The
court acknowledged that the state legislature had likely removed those
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PAC-Style Disclosure Requirements

Several of the states that do not use a major purpose-style test to
determine PAC status have opted instead to impose disclosure
requirements similar to the federal PAC requirements on all
organizations making contributions or expenditures exceeding a
certain amount.400 The state laws, like the federal PAC disclosure
laws, require organizations exceeding the threshold to register, name
a treasurer, maintain records and file regular reports with the state
agency charged with enforcement, and provide for penalties for noncompliance.401 The laws differ from each other in the amount of
spending that triggers the more extensive disclosure requirements,
how long groups have to register, the extensiveness of the filing
requirements, which donors groups must disclose, and the severity of
the penalties for non-compliance.402
With one exception, courts have upheld such laws against
challenges that they are unduly burdensome and thus violative of the
First Amendment. The First Circuit upheld a state law setting a
$5,000 threshold for imposing PAC status on groups receiving
contributions or making expenditures for “the purpose of promoting,
defeating or [expressly advocating or its functional equivalent for or
against] the nomination or election of any candidate to political
office.”403 Under the law, groups were required to register within
seven days of exceeding the threshold amount.404 Once registered,
groups were required to file six reports during election years and four
reports during non-election years.405 The law required all groups

communications from its EC definition to comply with a lower court’s order that had
since been overruled. Id.
400. See Malloy, supra note 324, at 450 (explaining the PAC-style disclosure
model).
401. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 471–72 (7th Cir.
2012); Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 42–43 (1st Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1635 (2012); Vt. Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 875 F. Supp. 2d
376, 380–81 (D. Vt. 2012).
402. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 471–72 (7th Cir.
2012); Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 42–43 (1st Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1635 (2012); Vt. Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 875 F. Supp. 2d
376, 380–81 (D. Vt. 2012).
403. McKee, 649 F.3d at 42. Notably, the appellee did not challenge the
substantive obligations attendant to non-major purpose PAC status or contest the
registration, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements. Rather, the appellee
challenged the definition of a non-major purpose PAC. Id. at 58.
404. Id. at 42 (citing ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21–A, § 1053 (2011)).
405. Id.
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exceeding the threshold to identify all contributors donating more
than fifty dollars to support or oppose a candidate or campaign.406
The law provided civil fines407 and criminal penalties ranging from
fines to imprisonment of up to six months for non-compliance.408
The Seventh Circuit upheld a state law setting a $3,000 threshold
for imposing PAC status on groups and individuals receiving
contributions or making expenditures on behalf of or in opposition to
a candidate, or “in support of or in opposition to any question of
public policy” to be submitted to the electors, or on ECs.409 Under
the law, groups were required to register within two days of exceeding
the threshold amount.410 Once registered, groups were required to
file four reports annually disclosing the sources of all contributions
and to file additional reports within a few days of receiving any
contributions exceeding $1,000.411 The law provided civil fines and
injunctions for non-compliance.412
The district court for the District of Vermont upheld a state law
setting a $500 threshold for imposing PAC status on any two or more
individuals receiving contributions or making expenditures “for the
purpose [of] . . . advocating a position on a public question, or
supporting or opposing one or more candidates in any election.”413
Under the law, groups were required to register within ten days of
exceeding the threshold amount.414 Once registered, groups were
required to file reports, up to six times during an election year and
once during non-election years, disclosing the sources of all
contributions exceeding $100.415 The law provided for civil fines,
investigations, enforcement actions, and criminal penalties ranging
from fines to imprisonment for up to six months for noncompliance.416

406. Id.
407. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21–A, § 1062–A(1) (2011); tit. 21–A, § 1020–A(5–
A)(A); tit. 21–A, § 1014(4).
408. See tit. 21–A, § 1004; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17–A, § 1252 (2008).
409. Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 497 & n.35, 480 (7th
Cir. 2012) (citing 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9–8.6(a) (2012)).
410. Id.
411. Id. at 471–72.
412. Id.
413. Vt. Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 875 F. Supp. 2d 376, 380 (D. Vt. 2012).
414. Id. at 396.
415. Id.
416. Id. at n.3.
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In Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life v. Swanson, the Eighth
Circuit, the sole exception, reviewed a state law setting a $100
threshold for imposing PAC status on any two or more individuals
receiving contributions or making expenditures.417 Under the law,
groups were required to register within fourteen days of exceeding
the threshold amount.418 Once registered, groups were required to
file one report annually and five reports during election years
disclosing the sources of all contributions exceeding $100.419 Failure
to comply could result in civil and criminal penalties, ranging from
fines to imprisonment of up to five years.420
Six of the eleven judges on the Eighth Circuit hearing Swanson
voted to grant a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the
law.421 The majority emphasized two points. First, the majority
maintained that the law impermissibly distinguished between
corporations and any other associations and individuals, the latter of
which were subject to additional burdens when their spending
exceeded the statutory threshold.422 Second, and more intrinsic to its
holding, the majority found that the burdens were substantial and
virtually identical to burdens imposed on PACs.423 Most onerous, in
the majority’s mind, was the reporting requirement triggered by a
$100 threshold, which continued until it was dissolved, regardless of
whether the association continued to make expenditures.424 The court
found that the government “ha[d] not stated any plausible reason why
continued reporting from nearly all associations, regardless of the
association’s major purpose, [wa]s necessary to accomplish [its]
interests.”425 The court found that the state could accomplish its
interests through “less problematic measures,” such as requiring
reporting whenever money is spent.426
417. See Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 867–68 (8th
Cir. 2012).
418. Id. at 886.
419. Id. at 887.
420. Id. at 870.
421. Id. The Court found that the lower court “abused its discretion by denying
their motion for preliminary injunction because [the plaintiff’s] w[ere] likely [to]
succeed on the merits of their claim that Minnesota’s campaign finance laws
unconstitutionally infringe upon the right to engage in political speech through
independent expenditures.” Id.
422. Id. at 871.
423. Id. at 872.
424. Id. at 873.
425. Id. at 877 (emphasis omitted).
426. Id. at 876–77 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Swanson represents a departure from the more deferential
approach that other courts take. Other courts repeatedly have
upheld laws distinguishing among speakers in the disclosure
context,427 and the Supreme Court has referenced the prohibition
against distinguishing amongst speakers only in the context of laws
prohibiting speech.428
Moreover, although the monetary thresholds were higher in the
laws that were upheld by other courts, they all required ongoing
reporting regardless of the extent of a PAC’s activity until it
dissolved. In Sorrell, the court found that the ongoing requirements
were “reasonable,” even though the committees were required to
make reports when they were inactive, because such reports “took no
more than ten to fifteen minutes to complete.”429 The dissolution
requirements in the law reviewed in Sorrell were arguably more
burdensome than the requirements in the law in Swanson, which
merely required checking a box on the front page of the form.430
Unlike the law struck down in Citizens United, the law in Swanson
did not require the organizations to speak through a separate
association nor did it limit who could make donations to the
organizations.431
IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: PLUGGING HOLES AND
INCREASING DISCLOSURE
A. Congress’s Role
In an era that promotes transparency, Congress should follow the
approach that several states have taken. Congress should enact broad
disclosure requirements that impose PAC-style continuous reporting
requirements on all individuals and organizations receiving
contributions or making expenditures over a certain amount in a
calendar year for the purpose of supporting or defeating a federal

427. See, e.g., Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 42 (1st Cir. 2011); Vt.
Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 875 F. Supp. 2d 376 (D. Vt. 2012).
428. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898–99 (2010)
(citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978)).
429. Sorrell, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 396.
430. Swanson, 692 F.3d at n.4; see id. at 885 (Melloy, J., dissenting) (disagreeing
with the majority that “fil[ing] a statement of inactivity which comprises a one-page
form, on which the treasurer can check a box for inactivity” does not impose an
“undue” burden).
431. Id. at 881 (Melloy, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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candidate.432 The threshold amount should be set at a level that is
sufficiently high so that it does not unduly burden small groups with
limited resources.433
The federal government can constitutionally require the proposed
comprehensive disclosure requirements. Since Citizen’s United, with
the exception of one circuit, all lower courts have found that the
major purpose test is not constitutionally mandated.434 In Buckley,
the Supreme Court read the major purpose test into a provision that
acted not only as a regulation, but also as a ban on speech by
restricting the amounts and sources of contributions to PACs. The
current PAC requirements serve only to regulate speech, thus
eliminating the need for the major purpose test.435 This reasoning is
supported by the Supreme Court’s assertion in Massachusetts
Citizens for Life that, although the Constitution mandated an
exemption for an organization from a limit on the use of its general
treasury funds for campaign-related activity, it did not exempt it from
more extensive disclosure requirements.436 Moreover, in Citizens
United, eight Justices rejected an attempt to limit the scope of
permissible disclosure requirements to its prior interpretation of
certain provisions of the FECA, thus implying that its prior limiting
construction of provisions placing limits on speech is not
constitutionally mandated for mere regulations of speech.437
By replacing the major purpose test with a monetary trigger,
Congress would reflect the sentiment of the vast majority of the
voting public and, at the same time, fulfill the original intent of the
BCRA by making it harder for organizations intent on circumventing
the requirements to avoid disclosure.438 The President has supported
broad disclosure requirements,439 especially in light of the Supreme
432. See generally supra Part III.B.2.
433. Cf. supra notes 400–02 and accompanying text.
434. See supra notes 342–47, 393–99 and accompanying text; see also Ctr. for
Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 484 & n.17 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining
how, although “Herrera was argued and decided after Citizens United, briefing [was]
completed prior to the Supreme Court’s decision,” and “[t]he only reference to
Citizens United was . . . in a footnote” of the court’s opinion). Moreover, two of the
laws that were found unconstitutional prior to Citizens United, imposed bans in
addition to disclosure requirements on non-major purpose organizations. See supra
notes 334, 338.
435. See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
436. See supra note 343 and accompanying test.
437. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
438. See supra notes 143–48 and accompanying text.
439. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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Court’s decision in Citizens United, which had the effect of greenlighting the use of campaign money laundering tactics by those
determined to avoid disclosure.440 In enacting broad disclosure
requirements, members of Congress would have no reason to fear
voter backlash, since the vast majority of Americans support
increased disclosure.441 Congress’s intent when it enacted the BCRA
was to prevent groups from easily circumventing disclosure
requirements by omitting Buckley’s magic words, which allowed
those groups to use obscure names to mislead the public.442 Today,
organizations just as easily can avoid disclosure as they could before
the BCRA’s enactment by omitting certain words and references in
their communications,443 siphoning contributions for general purposes
only,444 or using their coffers to finance other organizations’
campaign-related activities.445
A monetary trigger would increase predictability by providing
organizations with clear notice as to when they would be subject to
continued reporting requirements. Large organizations frequently
have many purposes,446 and determining their single major purpose is
no easy task.447 Moreover, the major purpose of organizations may
shift over time.448 For example, the major purpose of an organization
during a federal election campaign could be influencing the election,
but once the election is over, the major purpose could shift to other
missions, such as influencing the legislative agendas of members of
Congress.449 That an organization’s major purpose may shift over
time should not be the basis for finding that the organization’s major
purpose is not influencing elections.
As it stands now, the major purpose test serves as an easy way for
organizations to thwart disclosure requirements by either increasing
non-campaign related activities or by merging with organizations that

440. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
441. See supra note 50, at 9.
442. See supra notes 142–46 and accompanying text.
443. See supra notes 253–58, 278–84, 299–305 and accompanying text.
444. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
445. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
446. See supra note 346
447. See supra notes 296–314 and accompanying text (discussing the FEC
Commissioners’ disagreement over how to determine a group’s major purpose).
448. See supra note 305.
449. See, e.g., Editorial, When Super PACs Become Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
26, 2012, at A30.
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are not engaged in campaign-related activities.450 The prevalence of
this circumvention is apparent from the rapid increase in undisclosed
spending following the Supreme Court’s decision in Wisconsin II.451
A monetary trigger would make it more difficult for organizations to
avoid disclosure by funneling money from non-PAC organizations or
shell corporations to political committees.452 Even those with the
resources and determination to avoid disclosure would be less able to
hide inside the corporate equivalent of matrushka dolls.453
Furthermore, by doing away with the major purpose test, nonPACs no longer would be able to avoid disclosure by instructing
donors who wish to remain undisclosed not to earmark their
contributions.454 Large organizations involved in non-campaignrelated activity would still be able to establish segregated funds for
campaign activity if they did not want to disclose all contributions, but
would not be required to do so.455 As a result, many large
corporations would be incentivized to create segregated funds, which
would have the added effect of protecting shareholder interests by
ensuring that large corporations would not be able to spend
exorbitant amounts of their general treasury funds on campaignrelated activity that was contrary to their shareholders’ interests.456
B.

The FEC’s Role

All six members of the FEC should enforce the plain meaning of §
100.22(b)’s definition of express advocacy. Enforcement of the plain
meaning means that the agency must consider, “when taken as a
whole,” whether the advertisement expressly advocates the election
or defeat of a federal candidate.457 Section 100.22(b) is not invalid on
constitutional or statutory grounds, and without it, groups can easily
evade disclosure by avoiding the use of “magic words,” thereby
frustrating the intent of the BCRA.458

450. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
451. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
452. Cf. supra notes 204–08 and accompanying text.
453. See supra notes 204–08 and accompanying text.
454. Once an organization’s contributions or expenditures were to exceed the
threshold amount, all donors contributing more than $100 to the organization would
be disclosed. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
455. See, e.g., supra note 148 and accompanying text.
456. Cf. supra note 148 and accompanying text.
457. 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) (2013).
458. See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text.
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Section 100.22(b) is not unconstitutional because it extends beyond
the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Buckley. In order to avoid
facial invalidation of a law, a court is required to consider any limiting
construction and not the most liberal construction that is permitted
under the Constitution.459
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s
interpretation did not foreclose the possibility of subsequent agency
action.460 This understanding is supported by the Supreme Court’s
conclusion in McConnell that Buckley’s magic words test was “a
product of statutory interpretation and not a constitutional
command.”461 It also helps explain why the Chief Justice’s controlling
opinion in Wisconsin II rejected the argument that the only
permissible test for express advocacy is the “magic words” test,462 and
why the Court has declined to hear challenges to § 100.22(b)’s
validity.463
Congress intended the FEC to enforce § 100.22(b) when it enacted
the BCRA. The intent of the BCRA was to increase disclosure and
prevent outside groups from easily circumventing disclosure
requirements.464 In enacting the BCRA, Congress listened to
substantial hearings and engaged in extensive debate over proposed
amendments to many aspects of the FECA.465 Although members of
Congress expressed concern over the constitutionality of § 100.22(b),
they did not act to strike it down.466 Congress also did not attempt to
limit the FEC’s authority to promulgate rules expanding the
definition of express advocacy.467 That members of Congress were
aware of § 100.22(b) and the potential constitutional issues
surrounding it but chose not to amend or repeal it constitutes, at a
minimum, acquiescence to the FEC’s statutory authority to continue
to enforce § 100.22(b).468
When Congress enacted the BCRA, its clear intent was to define
ECs more expansively than the pre-existing definition of express

459. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
460. See supra notes 267–68 and accompanying text.
461. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 103 (2003).
462. See Real Truth About Abortion v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 681 F.3d 544, 551
(4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 841 (2013); supra note 243.
463. See Real Truth About Abortion v. Fed, Election Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 841
(2013) (denial of certiorari).
464. See supra notes 141–46 and accompanying text.
465. See supra note 269.
466. See id.
467. See supra notes 269–72 and accompanying text.
468. Cf. supra note 230 and accompanying text.
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advocacy.469 Congress clearly was aware that, during the thirty or
sixty days preceding an election, some communications that would
otherwise constitute express advocacy could qualify as electioneering
communications.470 By inserting language in § 434 stating that ECs do
not constitute independent expenditures, Congress clearly intended
to convey that ECs were not to be narrowly construed in such a way
as independent expenditures had been in Buckley.471 To construe the
language otherwise would lead to the seemingly absurd result that, by
enacting the BCRA, Congress intended to limit enforcement of
express advocacy. Moreover, the filing conundrum can be resolved
by requiring that all communications within the requisite number of
days before an election that would otherwise qualify as express
advocacy be filed as ECs and express advocacy.472
The FEC should determine whether a communication “refers to a
clearly identified federal candidate” by looking to the references in
the context of the communication as a whole.473 In enacting the
BCRA, Congress intended to provide disclosure requirements that
would not be easily evaded by avoiding certain words.474 By
interpreting “clearly identified” statically, the Commissioners are
ensuring that organizations will have a clearly defined manual for
evasion, thereby frustrating Congress’s general intent. The phrase
“refers to a clearly identified candidate” is not static, but varies
depending on the timing and the context of the communication as a
whole. Moreover, § 100.17 does not use any qualifying language that
would prohibit consideration of external events.475 What may not be
an “unambiguous reference” to a candidate six months prior to an
election may be in the days immediately preceding the election.
Further, as elections draw nearer, candidates become closely
associated with issues, such that a reference to those issues, in
viewers’ minds, may be a reference to the candidates themselves.476

469. See supra note 144–47 and accompanying text.
470. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3)(A) (2006); 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9) (2013).
471. See supra notes 270–71 and accompanying text.
472. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
473. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
474. See supra notes 141–46 and accompanying text.
475. Compare 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) (2013), with 11 C.F.R. § 100.17 (2013).
476. See Nat’l Def. Comm., Comments on A.O. Request 2012-27, at 2–5 (Fed.
Election Comm’n Aug. 6, 2012); supra note 261 and accompanying text. For
example, a reference to Obamacare would have been meaningless before its usage
was adopted to mean legislation that was part of the President’s first term agenda.
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The Courts’ Role

The Heightened Specificity Standard Should Not Apply to
Disclosure Laws

The “greater degree of specificity” that laws restricting speech
require should not apply to laws compelling disclosure. The Supreme
Court has only applied a heightened specificity standard for
vagueness in the context of laws that act as a ban on speech.477 Broad
standards in the context of disclosure laws do not create the same
vagueness concerns that they do in the context of standards that are
used to determine when an entity may speak. A broad standard will
not have a real and substantial deterrent effect on legitimate
expression because entities are not faced with determining whether
speaking would subject them to criminal sanctions, but whether they
will be penalized for not disclosing information related to their
speech.478 Thus, the effect is that entities will disclose more than they
would otherwise have to, not that they will refrain from speaking.
Organizations concerned with over-disclosure have a variety of means
by which they can limit disclosure, such as by creating separate
segregated funds.479
The Supreme Court’s justifications for applying exacting scrutiny
instead of strict scrutiny to disclosure laws lends further support to
this argument.480 Broad laws compelling disclosure do not impose a
ceiling on campaign-related activities,481 and serve important
governmental interests, including preventing groups from easily
circumventing disclosure requirements.482

2.

Courts Should Be Deferential to State Attempts to Discover the
Extent of Outside Influence in their Local Elections

With overall spending on state elections generally far more limited
than spending on federal elections, outside groups spending large
amounts can have a disproportionate influence on local elections.483
Arguably, then, states have an even greater interest than the federal

477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.

See generally supra Part I.B.
See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
See id.
See generally supra Part I.B.1.
See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
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government in requiring disclosure of adequate information to enable
their citizens to assess the extent of outside influence on local
elections. Local representatives, too, have recognized the negative
impact of non-disclosure by voting in favor of increased disclosure,
often against their own interests and the interests of the special
interest groups that contribute substantially to their reelection
campaigns.484 Thus, a state’s ability to implement broad disclosure
requirements represents a concerted effort on behalf of local
legislators to meet the needs of their state’s citizenry.485 Recognizing
both the strong interest of the states486 along with the expertise of
state legislatures in matters relating to campaign finance and the
charge of state legislatures to pass laws tailored to address the specific
needs of their state, courts should be particularly deferential to state
decisions to compel disclosure.487
By invalidating pure disclosure laws, courts undermine the notions
of horizontal federalism and state autonomy.488 States should be free
to serve as laboratories of experimentation, especially in the context
of determining the electorate and reducing the influence of outside
groups on the electorate subject to the bounds of the Constitution.489
While courts can be inquisitive when states enact disclosure
requirements that set relatively low monetary thresholds, they should
still be deferential.490
CONCLUSION
The proliferation of undisclosed spending in recent elections has
resulted in increasing calls for the FEC and Congress to act. Eightyfive percent of Americans surveyed desire increased disclosure.
Although Congress and the FEC may be divided, the nation is not.
Congress and the FEC should act to increase disclosure to meet the
public’s demands.
On the judicial front, although courts have been nearly unanimous
in upholding state disclosure laws, the Eighth Circuit’s decision in
Swanson signals that this trend may be reversing. Without proper
guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts will be forced to
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.

See supra notes 328–32 and accompanying text.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
See Patrick M. Garry et al., supra note 325, at 37, and accompanying text.
See supra note 366 and accompanying text.
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continue to grapple with a series of confusing and seemingly
contradictory precedential decisions that offer little guidance
concerning whether enhanced disclosure is constitutional. In the
meantime, lower courts should continue to accord state legislatures
deference in their decisions to increase disclosure of campaign
spending in local elections.

